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ABSTRACT 
SONGCUI HU: A Behavioral Perspective on Attention Allocation Among Multiple Goals: 
An Exploratory Examination of the Automotive Industry 
(Under the direction of Richard Bettis) 
 
Goals (aspirations) and attention allocation are of considerable interest in practice, in 
strategic theory, and in research on a behavioral theory of the firm.  Empirical studies of the 
allocation of attention to goals have been limited to two or fewer goals where sequential 
attention to goals is either not an issue or obvious. The exploratory research discussed in this 
dissertation is concerned with attention allocation when there are more than two goals. Here 
sequential attention is ambiguous regarding what goal to which attention should be shifted 
when the current focal goal is satisfied. Relying on the combination of multiple statistical 
methods including panel vector autoregression, ordinary least squares regression, and 
hierarchical linear regression, I test the long-run interplay of and attention allocation among 
three product goals (car fuel efficiency, safety, and reliability) using a large dataset from the 
US automotive industry from 1980 to 2009. Major results involve the complexity of shifting 
attention among goals, issues raised by the correlation structure among multiple goals, and 
the context dependence of attention shifts.  These results suggest the necessity of a 
substantial modification of the theory of attention allocation.  Conjectures are discussed 
regarding aspects of a new theory of attention allocation for more than two goals in the 
presence of interdependency.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Organization aspirations, desired performance levels in specific organizational 
outcomes, are central to strategic decision making. Setting goals and objectives is a long-
standing component of strategic planning (e.g., Ansoff, 1984; Chandler, 1962; Hofer & 
Schendel, 1978). Managers establish organizational goals to communicate strategic direction 
(Fiegenbaum, Hart, & Schendel, 1996), enhance performance (Carver & Scheier, 1981; 
Eisenhardt, 1985; Hamel & Prahalad, 2005), and provide measures of success (Kaplan & 
Norton, 1996, 2001; Meyer, 2002). The literature generally treats aspirations and goals as 
similar concepts. Therefore, in this dissertation, aspirations and goals are used 
interchangeably as both concepts lie under the umbrella term – aspirations.  
There are numerous theories that provide directional guidance on specific goals, such 
as the resource-based view that recommends building competencies (Barney, 1991); Ansoff’s 
view that based on forward-looking, goal-seeking, and analytical planning (Ansoff, 1979, 
1987); and strategic reference point theory (Fiegenbaum et al., 1996) that is founded on 
strategic choice concepts and prospect theory.  However, most of the existing literature on 
aspirations follows the behavioral theory of the firm (BTOF) which is based on the Carnegie 
School concepts of bounded rationality, satisificing, search, adaptive learning, and sequential 
attention (Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1947). 
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This stream of work has comprehensively characterized both antecedents and 
consequence of organization aspirations. Specifically, it is concerned with differences in risk 
preferences when performance is either above or below a goal. It has mainly focused on a 
single goal and how the consequences of performance relative to the aspiration level 
motivate various organizational actions (Bromiley, 1991; Chen & Miller, 2008; Greve, 1998, 
2003; Iyer & Miller, 2008; Miller & Chen, 2004; Shimizu, 2007).  
However, much of organization theory explicitly recognizes the reality that 
organizations have a wide range of overall and subunit goals such as market share, quality, 
productivity, and customer satisfaction (Cyert & March, 1963; Scott, 1998). The existence of 
multiple goals within organizations is tightly tied to the nature of organizations. According to 
the Carnegie perspective (Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1947), 
organizations bring together a set of participants with conflicting interests, goals and 
knowledge to cooperation in collective action. Organizational members agree to participate 
so long as the perceived value of the inducements they receive from the organization exceeds 
the perceived opportunity costs of their contribution (Barnard, 1938). However, given 
uncertainty and bounded rationality, the implicit contract between the organization and its 
members is incomplete. With the specialization of decision making and information 
processing inherent in organization, conflicts among various groups within organizations are 
never fully resolved. 
The role of conflicting interests and goals was partially incorporated into agency 
theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), 
and upper echelons perspectives (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Yet, these theories’ treatments 
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of conflicting interests and goals depart in fundamental ways from the Carnegie School view 
(Gavetti, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2007). 
The Carnegie School (Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1947) 
argues that multiple goals within organizations compete for the limited pool of organizational 
resources, including energy, time, and attention. For instance, Penrose (1959) argued that 
rapid firm growth is associated with decreases in production efficiency, because planning for 
growth takes managerial focus away from keeping production cost down. Multiple-goal 
pursuit often requires attempting to dynamically balance between opposing demands for the 
limited resources, to ensure that moving toward one of the goals does not compromise all 
other goals (Ocasio, 1997). For example, during a conversation with Automotive News on 
Toyota’s national safety recall, Seigo Kuzumaki, the project general manager for vehicle 
safety in Toyota, said 
"We are trying to find the engineering man-hours for these quality 
issues. The surging demand for engineers in safety is forcing Toyota to 
rebalance resources in product development while trying to keep products on 
schedule. In some cases, that may result in slowed product development, but 
the company is trying to avoid this… Shifting resources to safety was the right 
compromise at the right time. Toyota needs to move faster to respond to 
customer needs…”(Automotive News, 2010) 
Therefore, pursuing multiple goals can create managerial challenges. Specifically, decision 
makers find it cognitively difficult to manage multiple interdependent goals and ultimately 
can face confusion and lack of direction (Jensen, 2001), or get caught in a status quo trap 
(Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2009). This clearly suggests that theoretical and empirical exploration 
of the boundary conditions of attention allocation is necessary. 
Previous studies while recognizing the realities of goal structures in complex 
organizations have typically focused on the determinants and consequences of successful 
single-goal pursuit (Locke & Latham, 1990). Surprisingly little is known about the flow of 
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organizational goal-directed behavior in multiple-goal pursuit. Sequential attention is the 
major theory on attention allocation among multiple goals (Cyert & March, 1963). It states 
that organizations only focus on one goal at a time, and shift all attention to the next goal 
once the current one is satisfied. Much of this literature is theoretical in nature. There has 
been only one empirical study (i.e., Greve, 2008) which considered two organizational goals 
and none that considered more than two goals1. Firms and their subunits each can and 
obviously do have more than two goals. The increasing number of goals reflects the increase 
of interdependent constraints (Simon, 1955). Multiple constraints further increase the 
complexity of decision making, information processing, and attention allocation (Cyert & 
March, 1963; Simon, 1964; Sullivan, 2010). When the number of goals is two, the switching 
rule for sequential attention is simply to choose the other goal when the first goal has been 
met.  However, when there are more than two goals the situation is complicated since there is 
no theoretical rule or empirical research defining how a choice of the next goal for attention 
is determined. Moreover, organizational goals may be interdependent. Interrelated goals may 
be congruent and mutually reinforcing or, more commonly, divergent, whereby the 
satisfaction of one goal comes at the expense of decreasing performance on one or more 
other goals. Consequently, the attention allocation becomes much more complicated.  
Furthermore, previous empirical studies have assumed that all organizations in the 
reference group (e.g., industry, industry segment, or strategic group) follow the same rule of 
attention allocation. However, scholars have suggested that attention allocation is context 
                                                 
1There are some studies in the literature examining different measures of performance. For example, Miller and 
Chen (2004) have investigated the effects of multiple measures of profitability on risk taking. Also, some 
studies have examined multiple goals or reference points. For instance, Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, and Chuang 
(2005) analyzing two different organizational goals indicate that failure to fulfill one goal was enough to trigger 
risk taking behavior.  Audia and Brion (2007) find that a self-enhancement bias makes individuals facing two 
divergent goals tend to focus on the one they exceed, and thus to have bias toward inertia and inaction. 
However, those studies are fundamentally different from the focus of this study on the attention allocation 
among multiple goals.  
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dependent (Ocasio, 1997), and the order in which goals are attended is not uniform across 
organizations but depends on the preferences of the “dominant coalition” of each 
organization (Cyert & March, 1963).  
This dissertation intends to take the first step toward building a nascent theory of 
attention allocation to multiple goals, especially when the number of goals exceeds two. The 
literature has examined various processes and mechanisms for minimizing or resolving 
conflicts among multiple goals within organizations, including hierarchy (Simon, 1947), 
incentives (Barnard, 1938; Cyert & March, 1963), and organization structures (Burton & 
Obel, 1988; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967). In this dissertation, I am interested 
in one form of goal conflict that is important and realistic, but remains understudied – the 
attention allocation among more than two goals at a single hierarchical level. I explore 
attention allocation to multiple goals within and across automotive companies at the level of 
the individual automobile model. The research is exploratory since empirical studies 
involving more than two goals have not previously been conducted, and lack a theoretical 
basis regarding sequential choice.  This exploration is driven by propositions based in what 
seem to be reasonable modifications and extensions of current theory. The main emphasis of 
this work is on the recognition of the interdependencies of goals, the contextual dependence 
of decision making, and the consequent challenges of attention allocation to multiple goals 
within organizations. It develops and tests a model of how organizations selectively regulate 
the allocation of attention among multiple goals using the panel data from the US automotive 
industry.  
Major results include the complex nature of attention shifts, issues caused by the 
correlation structures of multiple goals, and context dependence. The details of these results 
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provide important insights and suggest the necessity of a substantial extension and 
modification of the theory of attention allocation. Conjectures are discussed regarding some 
aspects a new theory might include. Subsequent research will be directed at formal testing of 
these conjectures.  Some preliminary rules may be applicable, though at this point the 
outlines of a new theory are still vague regarding the static allocations of attention across 
multiple goals under various conditions and the detailed dynamics regarding what drives 
reallocation and the resulting new allocation of attention given various drivers of change. In 
particular it turns out that the rules of switching attention are likely to depend in part on the 
context and particularly goal correlation structures.  This is counter to the usual assumption 
of homogeneity of switching rules within a particular reference group. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. First, I start with a brief 
review of the background theory, including bounded rationality and attention theory, multiple 
goals and sequential attention, and performance feedback. Next, I develop a set of 
propositions in the context of current literature. I then offer a method section that includes a 
description of the sample, the statistical technique employed, and variables and 
measurements. Next, I present results of the empirical analysis, including descriptive 
statistics, results from the panel vector autoregression (VAR) analysis and ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression analysis, and several robustness checks. Finally, I conclude with a 
discussion section which includes contributions, implications for theory and practice, and 
limitations and future research directions.
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND THEORY 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate how decision makers in the 
organizations allocate attention to multiple conflicting goals. In this chapter I start with a 
brief review of the relevant attention theory. I then review the literature on multiple goals 
within organizations, and discuss how sequential attention can sometimes resolve conflicts 
among multiple goals. I finally review the literature on adaptive aspirations and performance 
feedback to summarize the importance of attainment discrepancy on attention allocation to 
goals. 
2.1   Bounded Rationality and Attention Theory 
More than half century ago, Herbert Simon (1947) introduced a new perspective on 
firm behavior, which boldly departed from economists’ theories of perfect rationality and 
highlighted the bounded rationality of humans in explaining how managers make decisions. 
For Simon, administrators satisfice – look for a course of action that is satisfactory – rather 
than optimize over the latent choice set. Bounded rationality results from limited attentional 
capability of humans. Hence organizations rely on performance feedback relative to goals in 
allocating attention. This involves issues of how the performance is valued and the scope of 
alternatives for consideration. Firm behavior is a cognitive and a structural process. 
Organizations make decisions with the limited attentional capacity of humans and under the 
structural influences of organizations on attention. 
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The concept of attention has a long history and tradition in organization theory. 
“Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid 
form,…Focalization, concentration of consciousness are of its essence….”(James, 1890). For 
Simon (1947), attention was referred to the set of elements that enter into consciousness at 
any given time, and was constrained by human limits on memory and computing power. 
Organizations influence individual decision-making by allocating and distributing the stimuli 
that channel the attention of administrators in terms of what selected aspects of the situation 
are to be attended, and what aspects are to be ignored. March and Olsen (1976) argue that 
there is a set of structural constraints on the allocation of attention, and there is a pattern of 
individual action within the constraints. The attention structures exist because of the 
interdependencies among the actions of individuals, the distribution of individual 
competences, and the distribution of values and resources across individuals.  
Early work on attention has emphasized how attention is shaped by routines and 
bounded rationality (Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958), and how attention is 
loosely coupled through enactment processes (Weick, 1979) and organized anarchy( Cohen, 
March, & Olsen, 1972). However, different scholars have emphasized different aspects of 
attention allocation and structuring, but ignored others. The concept of attention has not 
developed into a unified perspective on firm behavior (Ocasio, 1997). 
To bring back the dual emphasis on structure and cognition developed by Simon 
(1947), Ocasio (1997) develops an attention-based view of the firm (ABV) by incorporating 
current understanding of social structures, environmental influences, and individual and 
social cognition. He defines attention to encompass the noticing, encoding, interpreting, and 
the focusing of time and effort by organizational decision-makers on both issues (the 
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available repertoire of categories for making sense of the environment) and answers (the 
available repertoire of action alternatives). ABV focuses on how attention in organizations 
shapes organizational adaptation.  
Recently, ABV has been increasingly adopted as a meta-theoretical perspective in 
both theoretical (Barnett, 2008; Ocasio & Joseph, 2005) and empirical work (Bouquet, 2008; 
Bouquet, Morrison, & Birkinshaw, 2008; Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; 
Hung, 2005; Ocasio & Joseph, 2008; Sullivan, 2010). For example, Hoffman and Ocasio 
(2001) extend the study of organizational attention to the industry level. By empirically 
examining one important communication channel within the business press industry, they 
develop a theoretical model of industry attention to events that draws connections between 
the social and structural factors affecting the industry and the level of attention to events. 
They further point out that the search for accountability is a key factor in determining 
attention to events. Cho and Hambrick (2006) examine the role of attentional orientation of 
top management teams (TMTs), and find that deregulation causes a shift in managerial 
attention in the context of airline deregulation, and that attention partially mediates the 
relationship between TMT changes and strategy changes. These results shed light on the 
transformation of industry attention patterns following an environmental shift, and the role of 
TMT composition and incentive systems in that process. By studying failed Clinton reform 
initiative in healthcare, Nigam and Ocasio (2010) explore how event attention leads to 
change in field-level institutional logics. Table 1 presents a summary of selected empirical 
research on attention in organizations and strategic management undertaken since the 
publication of ABV (Ocasio, 1997).  
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Meanwhile, overall attention to attention employing a wide variety of meta-theories 
has also been flourished (Kaplan, 2008; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006). 
For instance, Weick and Sutcliffe (2006) have challenged the Carnegie School assumption 
that attention is a scarce resource and contended that when the allocation of attention is done 
with discipline, such as with the mindfulness emphasized in Buddhist psychology and 
philosophy, attention can be plentiful and sufficient and can be paid to different problems by 
decision makers. 
Despite the increasing attention to attention in the last decade, the research has led not 
to a cumulative body of work but led to a variety of often disparate findings. The main reason 
for this is that the research on attention relies on both different meta-theories and different 
definitions and understanding of the construct of attention itself. In a recent review study, 
Ocasio (2011) examines attention in light of recent developments in the cognitive 
neuroscience of attention (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Posner & Rothbart, 2007), which 
suggests that attention is not a unitary concept but a variety of interrelated mechanisms and 
processes that operate in diverse ways in the human brain. To distinguish between the 
varieties of meaning, he classifies the usages of the attention concept into three ideal types 
based on their focus on structure, process, or outcomes: attentional perspective, defined as 
“the top-down cognitive (and motivational) structures that generate heightened awareness 
and focus over time to relevant stimuli and responses”; attentional engagement, defined as 
“the process of intentional, sustained allocation to cognitive resources to guide problem 
solving, planning, sensemaking, and decision making”; and attentional selection, defined as 
“the emergent outcome of automatic or intentional attentional processes that result in 
focusing attention on selective stimuli or responses to the exclusion of others”. 
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Ocasio (2011) further applies this framework to the behavioral theory of the firm. 
Specifically, within BTOF, “attentional perspective is shaped by organizational experience 
with existing decision and attentional rules;” “attentional engagement is triggered by failure 
to meet aspiration levels, leading to local search and organizational learning in decision and 
attentional rules;” “attentional selectivity is the resulting outcome of sequential attention to 
alternative aspiration levels, as well as attentional engagement that results in guided search 
(Greve 2008).” 
The extant literature on attention has important implications for the current study. 
However, there are at least three limitations. First, the complexity involved in attending to 
simultaneous claims in many different arenas and calculating both substantive and symbolic 
costs and benefits calls for a behavioral theory of attention (March & Olsen, 1976). Sullivan 
(2010) has tried to move toward this direction by examining how the current rules and new 
problems in the airline industry compete for organizational attention by analyzing the 
relationship between current rules’ finalization rate and the number of new problems under 
different circumstances. However, there is still a missing link of theoretical and empirical 
examination of the context through which multiple potentially conflicting goals interplay and 
compete for attention within organizations over time. Second, the behavior theory of the firm, 
as originally developed by Cyert and March (1963), is the most influential foundational 
perspective in examining the allocation of attention in organizations (Augier & Prietula, 
2007). However, as shown in Table 1, there is only one empirical study (i.e., Greve, 2008) 
relying on the BTOF and the same study is the only one that focuses on the attentional 
selection. More work built on the tradition of BTOF is needed. Third, while it has been 
suggested that attention competition is context dependent (Ocasio, 1997), there is a lack of 
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empirical investigation of how contextual factors such as firms’ characteristics including size 
and age affect the attention allocation patterns.  
2.2   Multiple Goals and Sequential Attention 
Organizations are thought to have a wide range of goals: profitability such as return 
on assets ( Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000; Bromiley, 1991; Greve, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Lant, 
Milliken, & Batra, 1992; Miller & Chen, 2004), productivity and sales (Audia & Sorenson, 
2001), market share and status (Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, & Chuang, 2005), and size (Greve, 
2008). The availability of multiple and potentially conflicting performance aspirations or 
goals is a pervasive feature of organizations. These different performance goals are often 
contradictory since they aim to capture different aspects of performance (Meyer, 2002; 
Meyer & Gupta, 1994). For example, Business Week ranks companies in the Standard & 
Poor’s 500 by using eight criteria of success that often diverge considerably (Business Week, 
2004). The balanced scorecard approach is directed at fine-grained non financial performance 
measures such as customer, internal business, and learning and growth.  It is designed to 
serve as a guide to strategy and managerial action (Kaplan & Norton, 2001), though it does 
little to help our understanding of how organizations deal with multiple performance goals 
that can be contradictory. 
The issue of multiple goals is intimately tied to Simon's (1947) notion of bounded 
rationality. According to the BTOF (Cyert & March, 1963), organizational goals (e.g. 
production goals, inventory goals, sales goals, market share goals, and profit goals) are a 
series of more or less interdependent2 constraints imposed on the organization through a 
                                                 
2The original work uses “more or less independent” instead of “more or less interdependent”. The author 
interprets it as “interdependent” for several reasons: first, the author believes, both terms say the same thing but 
with a different anchor. Both terms equally capture the different degrees of interdependencies caused by the 
constraints of multiple goals in organizations, but the former one is with the emphasis on the separate actions of 
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process of bargaining among potential coalition members and elaborated over time in 
response to environmental pressures. Goals arise in such a form because the firm is a 
coalition of participants with disparate demands, changing foci of attention, and limited 
ability to attend to all organizational problems simultaneously. More specifically, 
organizations factor their decision problems into sub-problems and assign the sub-problems 
to subunits in the organization. As a result of local rationality, this reduces to solving one 
problem in terms of only one goal at the subunit level. The sales department mainly focuses 
on sale goals and sales strategy; the production department is primarily responsible for 
production goals and procedures; and the pricing department is primarily responsible for 
price decision and profit goals. Thus, most of organizations most of the time exist and thrive 
with considerable latent conflict of goals.  
For Cyert and March (1963), there are three main mechanisms to resolve inconsistent 
goals across divergent coalitions. The first is to leverage acceptable-level decision rules, one 
characteristic of the decision making process. Acceptable-level decision rules facilitate the 
decision making process by requiring that local decisions satisfy local demands. Such 
decisions are made by separate decision centers thus resulting in a joint solution that satisfies 
all demands. However, different local demand constraints do not uniquely define a solution. 
And more importantly, acceptable-level decision rules often require excess (slack) resources 
to absorb potential inconsistencies in the local decisions. Slack can partially resolve the 
conflict among multiple goals, especially when organizations experience low performance, 
since slack can provide opportunities for organizational change (Levinthal & March, 1981), 
                                                                                                                                                       
possibly independent decision making by different departments with different goals in organizations, while the 
latter one with the emphasis on the joint outcome and performance of organizational decision making caused by 
the interaction of multiple goals. Second, as the dissertation will discuss the interdependency of goals in the 
later sections, the usage of “interdependent” instead of “independent” helps keep consistency throughout the 
dissertation. 
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and serve as a buffer against low performance. Slack can also be used as a buffer to protect 
against external shocks and future uncontrollable contingencies (Milliken & Lant, 1991), as 
well as experimentation with innovation (Bourgeois, 1981; Nohria & Gulati, 1996).  
Second, the resolution of inconsistent goals may occur via decentralization of 
decision making, e.g., the use of organization structures to map decision makers to goals. 
Burton and Obel's work has examined both single goals (Burton & Obel, 1980) and multiple 
goals among subunits (Burton & Obel, 1988) by comparing M-form and U-form structures 
under organizational design framework. Specifically, Burton and Obel (1980) find the M-
form yields superior performance in comparison with the U-form, especially so in nearly 
decomposable technological regime. Burton and Obel (1988) further compare the M-form 
and U-form structures under incentives (corporate and division) framework using a 
laboratory experiment. Although they do not address the problem of attention allocation 
among multiple goals under different organizational structures, they provide important 
implications for future investigation in this research vein.  
Third, more often, organizations resolve conflict among goals, in part, by resorting to 
another characteristic of decision process, sequential attention. Sequential attention is a form 
of quasi-resolution of conflict that lets decision makers treat different goals as constraints to 
be satisfied in some order of priority rather than as trade-offs that have to be weighed against 
each other (Cyert & March, 1963). Put differently, organizations attend to different goals at 
different times. As choices, problems, solutions, and energies exist in a time-frame (March & 
Olsen, 1976), organizations distribute their time and energy to choices and problems in a 
“fire station” manner (Cyert & March, 1963). In a world in which there is any scarcity in one 
or more of the streams, the timing of the several flows will affect the outcome importantly. 
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The resulting time under buffer between multiple goals permits organizations to solve one 
problem at a time, attending to one goal at a time (Cyert & March, 1963). Much of the 
literature in this vein is theoretical in nature, though a small empirical literature in accounting 
has examined this issue as well. 
Earlier work has modeled multiple goals using a parsimonious approach. For instance, 
Miller and Chen (2004) have investigated the effects of multiple measures of profitability on 
risk taking.  This approach treats the goals as alternative measures of the same construct 
which is appropriate for closely related goals, but not for qualitative goals, such as quality, 
sales, and productivity. Later work on multiple goals has showed certain reason for the 
existence of goal interdependencies. Baum et al. (2005) analyzing two different 
organizational goals indicate that failure to fulfill one goal was enough to trigger risk taking 
behavior.  Audia and Brion (2007), in an experimental and a field study, examine how 
decision makers respond to the ambiguity introduced by two diverging performance goals of 
unequal importance, and find mangers shift their attention from a primary to a secondary 
performance goal especially when the secondary performance goal was high and the primary 
performance goal was low, confirming managers’ self-enhancing mechanism. 
Among the few studies examining multiple goals and/or how firms shift their focus 
among multiple goals of different performance dimensions, Greve's (2008) work appears to 
be the first and the only empirical demonstration of sequential attention to goals in 
organizations using quantitative methods. Greve (2008) proposes that managers form an 
aspiration level for size through social comparison (Festinger, 1954) and they attend to the 
financial performance goal prior to the size goal, by robustly showing that firms grow more 
when they are below the aspiration level for size, especially when the performance goals are 
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satisfied. More recently, Ethiraj and Levinthal (2009) explore the trade-offs inherent in the 
pursuit and fulfillment of multiple performance goals in complex organizations using 
computational methods. They find that the simultaneous pursuit of multiple performance 
goals leads to a lock-in to the status quo bias, which counterintuitively could be mitigated by 
goal myopia, spatial differentiation, or temporal differentiation of performance goals. In their 
working papers, Joseph and his colleagues (Joseph, 2010a, 2010b; Joseph & Gaba, 2010) 
have extended the research on multiple goals by examining the relationship between goal 
interdependencies and organizational search, performance feedback of hierarchical goals and 
innovation, and TMT’s focus on global or local goals and new product introduction. 
Moreover, in the psychology literature, a multiple-goal, multilevel model of feedback effects 
on the regulation of individual and team performance has been proposed (DeShon, 
Kozlowski, Schmidt, Milner, & Wiechmann, 2004). Another study specifies that the 
individual's proximity to goal attainment and their emotions in completing the task define the 
model of multiple-goal pursuit (Louro, Pieters, & Zeelenberg, 2007).  
The above studies provide important implications for my investigation, however, 
there are several limitations in the current literature on goals. First, most of current studies 
have typically focused on a single goal, and thus lacked the investigation of the long-run 
relationship and competitive interaction among multiple goals within organizations. 
Theoretically, the more numerous the goals are, the more likely goals can confuse and dilute 
the allocation of attention, and the more important the role of goals and goal priority play in 
directing the attention of decision makers. Second, most of the extant studies have focused on 
financial performance goals but ignored other important performance goals such as 
production efficiency and quality. Although financial performance goals are clearly 
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important for explaining organizational behaviors as they are widely considered as ends, it is 
worthwhile to consider other goals as means by which financial performance goals are 
achieved. Some recent studies have tried to move toward this direction by examining a broad 
set of strategic behaviors, including illegal behavior (Mishina, Dykes, Block, & Pollock, 
2010), search (Chen & Miller, 2007), and learning (Baum & Dahlin, 2007). Third, “…goals 
are no more nature-given than aspiration levels are – organizational goals are constructed 
by managers and assigned to other managers or workers. They in turn construct their goals 
that may differ from the assigned ones” (Greve, 2003c:70). For instance, even if top 
managers announce that profitability is important and assign a goal variable such as ROA, 
the sales managers may still believe the market share is more important. The goals of the 
subunits within the firm connect the firm level and individual level goals, and thus play a key 
role in directing the character and the strategic direction of the firm. However, the literature 
on goals has mainly focused on either the firm level goal or individual level goal, but the 
intermediate level (such as the subunit or division level) goal has been largely ignored. Forth, 
sequential attention to goals may not be sufficient to explain or guide the attention allocation 
to multiple goals due to the contextual dependence of attention allocation (Cyert & March, 
1963; Ocasio, 1997).  However, few of the above studies have examined the possible 
heterogeneous patterns of attention allocation to multiple goals across firms. Vissa, Greve, 
and Chen (2010) suggest a need to add consideration of organizational form and governance 
into organizational attention allocation. It is an extremely important but challenging task to 
examine what factors enhance or inhibit the successful attainment of multiple goals and how 
goals should be attended to avoid conflict (Locke & Latham, 1990). It might be useful for 
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future work to integrate some aspect(s) from other theoretical views such as the managerial 
choice of importance or goal priority from Ansoff’s (1979) view. 
2.3   Adaptive Aspirations and Performance Feedback 
Aspiration levels are “the smallest outcome that would be deemed satisfactory by the 
decision maker” (Schneider, 1992: 1053) or “reference point that is psychologically neutral” 
(Kameda & Davis, 1990: 56). Adaptive aspirations have long been recognized as significant 
to understanding subjective utility and choice behavior (Selten, 1998; Siegel, 1957; Simon, 
1955, 1956). The decision maker observes feedback from the environment and compares it 
with a goal or an aspiration level, and searching is started if the aspiration level is not met 
(Cyert & March, 1963). Thus, the process of performance feedback in the BTOF is portrayed 
as an organizational decision process (Greve, 2003c).  
Built on the BTOF, there are two streams of research on aspiration levels. The first 
set is the determinants of aspiration levels. Due to the unobserved nature of the aspiration 
level in most contexts, rarely did research directly study aspiration levels. Exceptions include 
Lant and Montgomery (1987), Mezias, Chen, and Murphy (2002), and Blettner, He, Hu, and 
Bettis (2012).  Most extant research on aspirations has used some proxies to measure the 
aspiration level. These have mainly fallen into two mechanisms. The first mechanism 
assumes that organizations set their goals based on their historical performance and historical 
aspirations. March (1988) analyzes a model of risk taking where the aspiration level is built 
on a certain weight of the past performance and a certain weight of the past goal. The second 
mechanism assumes that organizations set their goals based on comparable others’ 
performance. Since individuals compare themselves with others (Kelley, 1952), management 
researchers (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1995) have extended 
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the notion of social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) from individuals to organizations. 
Furthermore, most current research on adaptive aspirations has examined the effect of both 
historical and social aspirations (Baum et al., 2005; Bromiley, 1991; Greve, 2003c; Herriott, 
Levinthal, & March, 1985; Knudsen, 2008; Miller & Chen, 2004).  
Most extant literature on social aspirations and reference groups has used the industry 
average or median as the social aspiration level. There are only a few exceptions. For 
example, Bromiley (1991) uses striving aspirations by adding an adjustment factor of 1.05 
for firms performing above their aspiration level in his study of corporate risk taking. 
Massini, Lewin, and Greve (2005) propose that innovating firms are more likely to select 
other innovating firms as their reference group and imitating firms are more likely to select 
the average firm in the population, or in the sub-population of non innovators, as their 
reference group. They also argue that the selection of a reference group is a crucial and 
neglected source of firm heterogeneity. Greve (2008) uses the firms with the similar size and 
performance to the focal firm as the reference group. Knudsen (2008) considers the situation 
in which firms may use the average of another population with higher performance as social 
reference point if they could afford the switching costs of moving to another population. 
Indeed, Hu, Blettner, and Bettis (2011) have suggested that firms’ reference group setting 
strategies are bundled with risk taking, and the effectiveness of heterogeneous strategies for 
setting reference groups varies under different contexts.  
The second stream is built around the consequences of performance relative to the 
aspiration level, i.e., the relationship between risk taking and attainment discrepancies, 
defined as the difference between performance and the aspiration level (Lant, 1992). The 
single reference point theory, which suggests that decision makers are risk seeking below 
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their aspiration levels, and risk averse above them, is central to modern theories of individual 
and organizational choice (Cyert & March, 1963; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; March, 1988). 
Attainment discrepancies have been considered as consequential for motivating all types of 
firm behavior including business-level strategy (Greve, 1998); firm risk taking (Bowman, 
1982; Bromiley, 1991; Miller & Bromiley, 1990; Miller & Chen, 2004; Singh, 1986; 
Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998), organizational learning 
( Greve, 2003c); innovation (Greve, 2003a; 2003b), decisions on R&D search (Chen, 2008; 
Chen & Miller, 2007), new product launches (Greve, 2007); corporate acquisition strategy 
(Iyer & Miller, 2008);  and divestiture (Shimizu, 2007).  
Recent studies on aspirations have extended the single reference point theory and 
proposed two other references points, survival and slack. Specifically, empirical 
investigations of choice by organizations indicate that organizational risk-taking behavior 
changes significantly at the extremes of performance. Some research suggests that when 
decision makers are at a certain distance below their normal reference point, they shift their 
attention to the survival point (Lopes, 1987; March & Shapira, 1987, 1992) and become risk 
averse (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981), e.g., they may be less likely to initiate 
acquisitions (Iyer & Miller, 2008) and more likely to engage in divestitures (Shimizu, 2007).  
There are some voices of opposition (Audia & Greve, 2006). A few studies suggest that 
increasing threats to survival stimulates greater and greater risk taking, presumably as an 
attempt to escape the threats (Bowman, 1982; Gooding, Goel, & Wiseman, 1996; Miller & 
Chen, 2004).  
Another extreme case is when organizational performance is significantly above the 
aspiration level. A positive association between very high levels of performance and 
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increased risk taking has been established (Singh, 1986). Some early studies (e.g. Mansfield, 
1961) have associated high levels of slack with high levels of innovation. The BTOF (Cyert 
& March, 1963) suggests that the presence of slack resources enables firms to increase slack 
search through activities such as innovation (Nohria & Gulati, 1996), organizational change 
(Kraatz & Zajac, 2001), and expansion through acquisition (Iyer & Miller, 2008). However, 
there are also some contradictory findings. Miller and Chen (2004) find no support for the 
positive relationship between slack and risk taking in spite of using multiple measures for 
key variables. Based on computational modeling, Hu, Blettner, and Bettis (2011) introduce 
into the previous models of adaptive aspirations a new risk preference function that 
incorporates changes in risk preference at extremes of performance, and find important 
differences in outcomes from earlier studies which invite further studies on managerial goal 
setting. Though the determination on reference point number and managers’ risk preference 
function is not the focus of the current study, this extension of studies beyond the scope of 
the BTOF has wide implications to organizational performance.  
Table 2 presents a summary of selected research on aspirations. From the review 
above, a few conclusions can be drawn. First, in aspiration formation, the proxies of social 
aspiration levels in most previous studies do not follow the rule of organizational similarity 
and information availability as suggested by Greve (2003c), since they have largely used the 
industry average or median as the social aspiration. Second, previous analyses have typically 
been conducted at the firm level. Though the importance of subunit goals has been widely 
recognized as discussed in the previous section, how to choose the reference group or set the 
aspiration level for the subunit in the firm has been ignored in the literature. Third, a single 
reference point theory has been and may continue being the focus of much of the theoretical 
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and empirical work on attainment discrepancies and performance feedback (Lant, 1992; 
Greve, 2003c).
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS 
 
Built on the theoretical foundations, this chapter develops three exploratory 
propositions.  
3.1   Sequential Attention and Discretionary Attention 
Organizations are characterized by the availability and presence of multiple and 
potentially inconsistent goals.  According to the BTOF (Cyert & March, 1963), 
organizational goals are a series of more or less interdependent3 constraints imposed on the 
organization through a process of bargaining among potential coalition members and 
elaborated over time in response to environmental pressures. The Carnegie School 
perspective suggests that decision makers have limited attention capacity, and multiple goals 
compete for limited organizational attention (Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958; 
Simon, 1947). The gain of attention by one goal is accompanied by the loss of attention by 
other goals. Furthermore, the BTOF suggests that organizations sequentially attend to 
multiple goals. Sequential attention is a form of quasi-resolution of conflict that lets decision 
makers treat different goals as constraints to be satisfied in some order of priority rather than 
as trade-offs that have to be weighed against each other (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2008). 
Organizations distribute their attention to multiple goals in a “fire station” manner. The 
resulting time buffer between multiple goals permits organizations to attend to one goal at a 
                                                 
3Empirical research has ignored this interdependency. Interdependency does not arise in studies of a single goal, 
and implies endogeneity within the model in the case of multiple goals. 
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time and move on to the next goal when the focal goal is satisfied (Cyert & March, 1963: 
117-119). 
Sullivan (2010) finds attention is guided by “urgency” induced by the aggregate flow 
of new problems, which is also partially consistent with the sequential attention rule. As the 
only empirical demonstration of attention allocation to multiple organization-wide goals, 
Greve's work (2008) proposes that managers form an aspiration level for size through social 
comparison and they attend to financial performance prior to the size goal. This greatly 
enhances our understanding of attention allocation between two goals at the firm level. 
However, firms and their subunits each can and obviously do have more than two goals. The 
increasing number of goals reflects the increase of interdependent constraints (Simon, 1955). 
Multiple constraints further increase the complexity of decision making, information 
processing, and attention allocation (Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1964; Sullivan, 2010). 
Specifically, when firms or subunits encounter two goals, there are two alternatives of 
attention allocation. The first is to attend to two goals, perhaps with unequal attention, at a 
time. The second is to attend to only one goal at a time, which is consistent with the 
behavioral theory of the firm.  With switching, there is no decision since there is only one 
other goal. When the number of goals is greater than two, the theoretical issue of which goal 
to attend to sequentially becomes more realistic, more complex, and more interesting 
theoretically. Firms may combine the two rules of attention allocation. Specifically, firms 
may not only sequentially attend to a subset of goals, but also simultaneously attend to 
multiple goals with varying levels of attention. Therefore, it is possible that firms shift their 
attention among a subset of but not all goals. This is reasonable because the order in which 
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goals are attended is not uniform across organizations but depends on the preferences of the 
“dominant coalition” of each organization (Cyert & March, 1963: 26-32). 
Moreover, the sequential attention rule focuses on a strict sequence in which one goal 
has to be satisfied prior to other goals. However, observations in organizations suggest the 
situation is more complex. Organizations might primarily focus on one goal at a time, but 
they are not likely to completely shift their attention away from one goal to another at any 
time.  Put differently, it is almost impossible for organizations to focus all attention on a 
single goal and switch all attention to another when the current one is satisfied. Competence 
building in any goal variable or performance dimension needs investment over time. It is 
difficult for firms to gain competitive advantage from time compression diseconomies when 
they allocate discontinuous attention to goals (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). Specifically, for 
automotive makers, they have to maintain some minimum amount of attention/effort in 
safety and efficiency dimensions because of government mandates. More importantly, the 
resources used to achieve these goals, for example, specialized engineering expertise, are 
sometimes not fungible. Furthermore, different goals in organizations represent different 
interests of coalitions within organizations (Cyert & March, 1963), so it is generally 
impossible for the interest of any coalition to be ignored. Thus, attention allocation to 
multiple goals is not a strict sequence in which one goal has to be addressed prior to other 
goals, but instead it takes the form of varying the distribution of attention across multiple 
goals over time. Hence, each goal within an organization draws some minimum level of 
attention (referred to as nondiscretionary attention) to keep the organization functioning. 
Organizations also have discretionary attention4, which is regulated by managers’ own 
                                                 
4The distinction between discretionary and nondiscretionary attention is similar to the notion of unabsorbed and 
absorbed slack (Singh, 1986). Unabsorbed slack corresponds to excess, uncommitted liquid resources in 
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discretion or judgment and available for use as needed or desired. The total attention in an 
organization is the sum of discretionary and nondiscretionary attention. Therefore, the key 
question of attention allocation is how to distribute the discretionary attention to multiple 
goals over time.  
Overall, as a third goal increases the complexity of attention allocation, more 
concepts besides sequential attention must be incorporated into the theory of attention 
allocation among multiple goals. Building on the current literature, I therefore propose the 
following to guide the empirical exploration: 
Exploratory proposition 1: Attention allocation is not a question of all or nothing. 
Attention is composed of discretionary and nondiscretionary components. Organizations shift 
discretionary attention among goals across time. 
3.2   Interdependencies of Goals 
Firms are frequently characterized by interacting organizational components (Rivkin, 
2000; Siggelkow, 2001), including organizational goals (Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2009). 
According to Thompson (1967), there are three types of interdependence in an organizational 
structure. Pooled interdependence is considered as the loosest form of the interdependence. It 
occurs when each organizational department or business unit performs completely separate 
functions. As departments may not directly interact and do not directly depend on each other 
in decision making, there is an almost blind, indirect dependence on the performance or goals 
of others. Sequential interdependence occurs when one unit in the overall process produces 
an output necessary for the performance by the next unit. The demand for coordination to 
prevent slowdown is greater than for pooled interdependence. Reciprocal interdependence is 
                                                                                                                                                       
organizations, while absorbed slack corresponds to excess costs in organizations. The amount of discretionary 
attention of goals may vary over time, though this is beyond the focus of the current study. 
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similar to sequential interdependence in that the output of one department becomes the input 
of another, with the addition of being cyclical. Reciprocal models are the most complex and 
difficult to manage, as they require the highest intensity of interaction. 
 Similarly, as multiple organizational goals impose a series of more or less 
interdependent constraints on the organization (Cyert & March, 1963), they can have 
different levels of interdependence. Goals can be independent or interdependent. Independent 
goals are those which are weakly correlated or uncorrelated to one another. Interdependent 
goals include congruent and divergent goals. Congruent goals are those which are positively 
correlated whereby the satisfaction of one will lead to the satisfaction of another. Divergent 
goals are those which are negatively correlated and for which the satisfaction of one may 
come at the expense of declining performance on another.  Divergent goals may not only 
introduce coordination problems and inhibit the search for information in attention allocation 
(Beyer, 1981; Mitroff & Emshoff, 1979), but also create latent or overt conflict within the 
organization (Cosier & Rose, 1977; March & Simon, 1958; Pondy, 1967). 
Thompson (1967) further suggests that organizations manage each of the three types 
of interdependence with different coordination methods. Similarly, goal interdependencies 
have several implications for attention allocation to multiple goals. First, the interdependency 
of goals may directly impact the complexity of decision making and affect the information 
processing capacity of the firm (Simon, 1955). Consequently, the effectiveness of 
organizational search and the attention allocation process is diminished. Second, goal 
interdependencies may result in or reflect the integration across subunits (Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1967) and smooth the coordination of activities within the firm (Child, 1974; 
Galbraith, 1973) which may aid innovation efforts. Moreover, goal interdependencies may 
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reflect normative environments and the degree to which cooperation exists and ideas are 
shared. Shared goals typically increase knowledge sharing within the firm (Birkinshaw, 1997; 
Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998), though pressure for joint decision-making may also supply one of the 
necessary conditions for internal comparison and conflict (March & Simon, 1958: 124).  
Thus, the effectiveness of search or attention allocation processes may be conceived as an 
outcome determined by the ease of coordination driven by goal congruence and the 
consequences of conflict driven by goal divergence. A complete theory of attention 
allocation among goals must include the impact of goal interdependence or correlation 
structures. 
Based on the discussion above, I therefore propose  
Exploratory proposition 2: Goals within organizations have complex correlation 
structures, and these matter to decision making in attention allocation.  
3.3   Context Dependence of Attention Allocation 
Researchers have generally assumed that problemistic search changes as a continuous 
function of the performance level (Bromiley, 1991; Lant et al., 1992) and that the strength of 
the reaction varies depending on whether performance is above or below the aspiration level 
(Greve, 1998). Consistent with literature (Lant, 1992; Lewin et al., 1944), attainment 
discrepancy is defined as the difference between performance and the aspiration level. 
Decision makers are more willing to take risk when the attainment discrepancy is negative 
than when it is positive (Cyert & March, 1963; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Organizations 
respond to low performance (negative attainment discrepancy) by making a broad range of 
strategic and operational changes, including acquiring resources, and increasing R&D and 
innovation efforts (Audia & Greve, 2006; Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000b; Greve, 1998, 
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2003a; Lant et al., 1992). Similarly, higher growth in any performance dimension can be a 
result of risk taking due to low performance in that dimension. This is because problemistic 
search may lead to discovery of actions that increase growth, and these actions may increase 
risk since change is always risky. The effect of any goal variable with positive attainment 
discrepancy should be considered separately.  Managers in a gain situation will be motivated 
to lock in the high performance of goal variables and less willing to take risk (Kahaneman & 
Tversky, 1979). Thus, the goal is less likely to be active in firms with the performance of that 
goal variable above the aspiration level, so the relation between a goal variable and its 
growth becomes weaker.  
However, the attention allocated to goal variables needs not depend completely on 
their attainment discrepancies. Different correlation structures among goals may lead to 
heterogeneous interaction structures of attention allocation. Consistent with Greve (2008), I 
consider three possible models of attention allocation corresponding to three types of goal 
correlations. The first is a parsimonious model in which each goal has a separate and 
independent effect on each other, and thus managerial actions. The second is a modified 
sequential attention model in which goals are conflicting with each other and cannot be 
pursued at the same time, and therefore, high performance on one goal shifts discretionary 
attention to the next, making organizations pursue one primary goal at a time. The third is an 
activation model in which goals are positively coupled with each other and low performance 
on one goal reinforces the effect of low performance on another, allowing organizations to 
pursue one goal more vigorously when another is not met. The growth of one goal variable 
results from a mixed effect of its own attainment discrepancy interacting with the attention 
allocation pattern which in turn is determined by the focal goal variable’s interdependencies 
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with other goal variables. Therefore, I would expect the effects of goal variables’ attainment 
discrepancies on their growth not to be homogeneous. This also implies that the correlation 
structure of goals could be some form of context dependence of attention allocation (Ocasio, 
1997). 
Moreover, Ansoff (1984) identifies multiple goals across various categories: society, 
community, shareholder, lender, customers, managers, and employees. He argues that goals 
have a priority in a hierarchy, and there is the potential for a specific goal to interact with, or 
moderate the influence of, another (Shinkle, 2012). Scholars have suggested that the order in 
which goals are attended ( the priority of goals) is not uniform across organizations but 
depends on the preferences of the “dominant coalition” of each organization (Cyert & March, 
1963). Managers may allocate their attention following various rules (March & Shapira, 1992; 
Ocasio, 1997). Therefore, the firm level in addition to the subunit level could be another form 
of context dependence of attention allocation (Ocasio, 1997).  
These arguments lead to the third proposition    
Exploratory proposition 3: Attention allocation among goals is context dependent.   
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
METHODS 
 
4.1   Sample and Data Collection 
I explore the propositions for attention allocation developed in the previous chapter in 
the automobile industry with a sample of light vehicle models that were active in the U.S. 
market between 1980 and 2009, inclusive. The analysis is limited to the U.S. market, because 
it is the biggest automobile market in the world and high-quality data are available. I also 
limit my analysis to the mass and luxury light-vehicle market by ruling out the very narrow 
niches of extremely luxurious performance/sporty car automobiles (e.g., those made by 
Ferrari, Lamborghini, Maserati, Maybach, and Bogadi). I choose to focus on the automotive 
industry for three reasons. First, the automobile industry is a competitive market in which 
high product performance on multiple dimensions is required by consumers and by the USA 
federal government. Automotive firms make substantial investment in engineering to develop 
complex products, so there is a substantial need for effective search and attention allocation 
processes. Second, if search and goal setting is influenced by competition, it should be 
possible to observe this process in the automotive industry. Conversations with engineers in 
this industry suggest that auto makers regularly scan public sources of information and use 
reverse-engineering to identify ideas for new product development. Third, automobiles have 
multiple important product performance indicators, such as fuel efficiency, reliability, and 
safety, which are considered to be interdependent with each other. Also, government 
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mandates various requirements that represent external shocks and translate into goals for fuel 
efficiency and safety. Hence, the automotive industry provides a good opportunity to 
thoroughly examine how organizations allocate attention across multiple product goals over 
time.  
To form the sample of auto models for this study, I identified a list of candidates 
through an extensive search of automotive magazines and databases, which I then verified 
through discussions with industry experts. Only those light vehicle models and non extreme 
performance cars were included. The product lines producing heavy duty trucks or other-
purpose products were excluded from the sample. Specifically, in 1980, there were 89 
models produced by 25 automakers. Overtime, the number of models increased. In 2009, 
there were 239 models produced by 38 automakers. The data consist of 5038 model-year 
observations in total, with an average of seven year observation periods for each model. The 
panel of the data is unbalanced. Over the observation period, the number of models and 
automakers varies, with some new models or automakers entering the market and some old 
ones extinct. For those models that only exist for a few years, there is not much room for 
managers to adjust their distribution of attention among safety, fuel efficiency, and reliability. 
Therefore, to reduce the noise of those models, I only included in the analysis the models that 
last for more than ten years. Conversations with industry experts confirm that models lasting 
for more than ten years have passed the introduction stage and become established. Ten years 
allow for at least one or two major redesigns in addition to varying levels of redesigning for 
every model year. This also somewhat mitigates problems caused by the substantial number 
of missing data in multiple variables. The final data analyzed in this study include 152 auto 
models with an average of about 20 observation points for each model.  
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Noteworthily, each automobile company can have multiple nameplates, and each 
nameplate can have multiple automobile models. For instance, Toyota Motor Corp has three 
different nameplates: Toyota, Lexus, and Scion. Under Toyota nameplate, there are different 
auto models including Accord, Civic, and Odyssey. The data of goal variable measures were 
collected and analyzed at the auto model level. 
I used three primary sources of data. The data for performance measures, car category, 
price, and other rating information were manually collected primarily from Consumer 
Reports (CR). As the most important, independent, and reliable source of auto information, 
this magazine provides scientific test results and ratings of hundreds of car products every 
year through frequent car road tests and wide customer surveys. The vehicle models assigned 
with low ratings by CR may suffer from decreasing demand or even be terminated by the 
auto makers. For example, Acura SLX was rated as “not acceptable” in 1997 and it was 
discontinued by Acura in 2000. I also validated and supplemented these data with the data 
from the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA), and the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The sales 
data and market share data were manually collected from Automotive News, a weekly 
automotive industry magazine. For in-depth coverage of automotive industry with special 
features, industry dynamics, and technology breakthroughs, I referred to automobile 
magazines including Motor Trend, Car and Driver, and Wards Auto Year Book. I retrieved 
data on firm level financial and operational data from the COMPUSTAT dataset of Global 
Annual and North America Annual.  
Finally, I supplemented the primary archival data with interviews with industry 
participants and observers, including executives, engineers, and industry experts from 
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different auto companies. These interview data further grounded my thinking about the 
industry. In particular, they strengthened my understanding of the causal mechanisms 
underlying attention allocation pattern(s) and helped me choose more accurate measures. 
They also helped in interpreting the results.  
4.2   Variables and Measurement 
Automakers have goals on safety, fuel efficiency and reliability, and measure 
performance relative to those goals. Reliability, also referred to as durability, is widely 
considered as one of the most important car performance measures. It is calculated based on 
frequency of repair records including body exterior, interior, engine mechanical, engine 
electrical, and so forth. Though different consumers have diverging perspective when buying 
a new or used car, no purchaser wants a vehicle that breaks down often and requires serious 
repairs throughout its life. Thus, car reliability is a key performance dimension. The 
“predicted reliability” measure from CR is used as the indicator of car reliability. It is based 
on auto engineers’ expert knowledge of new models and CR’s unique Frequency-of-Repair 
data for past models. Any predictions on new models are based on a model’s history because 
new models are mechanically similar or identical to earlier models. Reliability shows the 
average problem rate from all models in the survey year by year5. By comparing with the 
similar models in the market, each auto model is rated from 1 to 5 with approximately equal 
intervals and 5 as the best rating. Specifically, a problem rate not far from the average (7-
9.2%)6 gets the average rating of 3, to earn a rating of 2 or 4, a model’s problem rate differs 
                                                 
5CR surveys hundreds of thousands of its subscribers or readers to collect the data of the problem rate of each 
auto model each year.  
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by 2.5 percentage points. To earn a rating of 1 or 5, a model’s problem rate differs by at least 
5 percentage points.  
Safety is another extremely important car performance indicator and must meet 
requirements externally imposed by government. For instance, NHTSA and IIHS 
scientifically test new vehicle models and publish the crash test results each year. The safety 
rating from CR is collected as the indicator of car safety. CR has developed a Safety 
Assessment System, in which each model is assigned with an overall safety score from 0 to 
100. The overall safety score is equally divided into 5 ranges: the lowest rating of 1 is 
assigned to a model with an overall score between 1 and 20, the highest rating of 5 is 
assigned to a model with an overall score between 80 and 100, and models with a score 
between 21-40, 41-60, or 61-80 are assigned with a rating of 2, 3 or 4, respectively. 
Specifically, the overall safety score equally combines the accident-avoidance and crash-
protection ratings. Accident avoidance reflects CR’s test results for braking performance, 
emergency handling, acceleration, driving position, visibility, and seat comfort. Crash 
protection is based on the most current crash tests (IIHS offset-crash results and either 
frontal- or side-crash results from NHTSA), which are weighted according to experts’ 
judgment of their importance and the percentage of the time a particular seat is likely to be 
occupied. 
The third performance measure is fuel efficiency, which is important to consumers 
and the goal is also imposed by government. EPA measures the fuel efficiency of auto 
models before they are released to the market. I coded the fuel efficiency for each model 
from 1 to 5 using the rating from CR and EPA. The overall mileage per gallon (MPG) of 
                                                                                                                                                       
6The conversation with the director of the auto test center in Consumer Union suggests that the average problem 
rates of auto models from 1980 to 2009 are very stable, with some value between 7% and 9.2%. 
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each model was used, with MPG below 15 as 1, MPG between 16 and 20 as 2, MPG between 
21 and 25 as 3, MPG between 26 and 30 as 4, and MPG above 30 as 5. The test equipment 
and test procedure were not changed significantly until 2010 when the electric car was 
introduced. For instance, Nissan Leaf, an electrical car going on sale in Dec 2010, is 
estimated in kilowatts per hour, but its economy is displayed as 99 MPG by EPA, even 
though the car uses no “gallons” and, indeed, no fuel in the traditional sense. 
Conversation with experts at Consumer Union further confirmed that the ratings are 
reported as linear data after transforming from raw data for the ease of understanding. It also 
suggested that the intervals between different ratings are approximately equal, and the 
difference between them is interpretable. Moreover, the rating systems of three goal variables 
have been very consistent during the observation periods. This supports the validity of fitting 
continuous statistical models to the data7.  
Prior research has suggested that organizational decision makers construct aspiration 
levels from organizational reference groups using multiple criteria (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 
1995; Porac & Thomas, 1990; Reger & Huff, 1993) and that market participation is 
particularly important for choosing reference groups (Clark & Montgomery, 1999). Despite 
these findings, studies on social aspiration levels have typically used the mean or median 
performance, which implies that all organizations in the reference group are equally 
influential on a focal organization (e.g. Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000b; Fiegenbaum & 
                                                 
7Traditionally, transforming continuous raw data to ordinal categorical data will lose some information of raw 
data and thus the power of analyses. Specifically, the cost in the degradation of measurement due to 
dichotomization is a loss of one-fifth to two-thirds of the variance that maybe accounted for on the original 
variables (Cohen, 1983). The problems also include that the intervals of ratings may not be equal and the 
difference among them is not interpretable. Consequently, fitting continuous statistic models to the rating data 
might be biased to some degree. Under the empirical setting of this dissertation, as the rating data of three goal 
variables from CR are the best extant data, and more importantly, those data could be considered as interval 
data, hence, with large samples, I would expect the estimates from the models using these interval data are 
approximately consistent with those from the analysis using the raw data.  
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Thomas, 1988; Greve, 1998). A few exceptions (e.g. Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 2008) show 
that aspiration levels weighting firms by similarity gave stronger findings than those using 
the unweighted mean. Moreover, in the empirical setting of the automotive industry, 
automakers form different reference groups for each niche market/category such as small 
cars or SUVs. Consequently, it is unreasonable to compare a small car’s safety with that of 
an SUV or a truck, or set a truck’s fuel efficiency goal based on the small car’s fuel 
efficiency performance. Therefore, I categorized the auto models into 15 niche markets8 
based on the information from car purchase guidance providers including Consumer Reports, 
Edmunds, JD Power, and etc. Social aspiration level of each goal variable for a model in a 
specific year is calculated as that goal variable’s average performance of all auto models in 
the same category as the focal model. Attainment discrepancy is calculated as the difference 
between each goal variable’s performance and the corresponding social aspiration level. 
Change of performance / performance growth is calculated as the first difference of the 
ratings for each performance dimension. 
I also controlled model size, calculated as the logarithm of revenues of models, and 
model age, calculated as the logarithm of age. Table 3 summarizes all variables and their 
measures used in the dissertation.  
4.3   Statistical Method  
Proposition 1 states that attention allocation is not a question of all or nothing and 
attention includes both discretionary and nondiscretionary components. Proposition 2 states 
that goals within organizations have complex correlation structures. To explore those two 
propositions, I need to examine the relationships among fuel efficiency, safety, and reliability 
                                                 
8Niche markets refer to as small cars, compact cars, family sedans, large cars, sporty cars, upscale sedans, 
upscale sporty cars, luxury sedans, luxury sporty cars, SUVs, luxury SUVs, hybrid cars, wagons, minivans, and 
pickups. 
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over time. Estimating the relationship among the three goals across time is difficult because 
the three are determined endogenously. The literature (e.g. Holtz-Eakin, Newey, & Rosen, 
1988) suggests that the interplay of three performance dimensions as a dynamic coevolving 
system of interdependent variables is best described in the context of a Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) model.  Because data are collected on numerous auto models at a 
yearly frequency, I am able to employ a Panel Vector Autoregression (PVAR) model. The 
PVAR combines the traditional VAR approach which captures co-evolution and 
interdependencies between multiple time series and treats all the variables in the system as 
endogenous, with the panel data approach which corrects for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity. Because of the complicated dynamics in the VAR, impulse responses are often 
more informative in understanding the evolution of interdependent variables over time than 
the raw estimated VAR regression coefficient, and they are reported as a standard practice in 
the VAR analysis (Stock & Watson, 2001). Simulation of each of the three estimated 
equations from the VAR analysis is usually used to examine the temporal response of each 
variable to the shock of each other variable. These simulations are called impulse response 
functions (IRFs) and can yield important insights. Specifically, IRFs show the response of 
one variable of interest (e.g. safety) to a shock in another variable of interest (e.g. fuel 
efficiency), while holding other shocks constant. Plotting IRFs graphs is a practical way to 
visually represent the behavior of the variable series in response to the various shocks 
(Enders, 2010). A discussion of the standard VAR model is presented in Appendix A. 
The PVAR methodology has several econometric advantages. It does not impose any 
a priori causal structure on the relationship between the variables in the model. Instead, all 
current period measures of fuel efficiency, safety, and reliability are allowed to be a function 
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of the past values of each other. This enables us to estimate, for example, the total reduced-
form effect that a past increase in fuel efficiency had on each of the other dependent variables 
and how those changes move over time. I specify a first-order three-variable VAR model as 
follows: 
Xit = A0 + A1Xit-1 + fi + et                                                           (1) 
where Xit is the three-variable vector: {z_safety, z_efficiency, z_reliability}; z_safety is the 
standard score of safety, z_efficiency is the standard score of efficiency, and z_reliability is 
the standard score of reliability.  
In applying the VAR procedure to panel data, we need to impose the restriction that 
the underlying structure is the same for each cross-sectional unit. One way to overcome the 
restriction on parameters is to allow for “individual heterogeneity” in the levels of variables 
by introducing fixed effects of the model, denoted by fi in the model. Since the fixed effects 
are correlated with the regressors due to lags of dependent variables, the mean-differencing 
procedure commonly used to eliminate fixed effects will create biased coefficients9. I use 
forward mean-differencing, also referred to as the Helmert procedure (Arellano & Bover, 
1995; Eakin, Newey, & Rosen, 1988), to avoid this problem. This procedure removes only 
the forward mean, i.e., the mean of all the future observations available for each model year. 
This transformation preserves the orthogonality between transformed variables and lagged 
regressors, I use lagged regressors as instruments and estimate the coefficients by system 
generalized method of moments (GMM).  
                                                 
9The inclusion of lagged dependent variables can be a source of bias for fixed-effect estimation of dynamic 
panel-data models. The intuition is that the fixed effect would be “double-counted” in some sense if the 
dependent variable is included in the regression equation at time t and also at previous times due to the lag 
structure. This problem is known as “Nickell-bias” afeter Nickell (1981). Nickell-bias is often observed to be 
rather small, however, and so its importance is a matter of debate.  
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I focus my analysis on the IRFs, which describe the reaction of one variable in the 
systems to the innovations in another variable in the system, while holding all other shocks at 
zero. However, since the actual variance/covariance matrix of errors is not sufficient to 
identify the primitive system, and unlikely to be diagonal, additional restriction on the three-
variable VAR system must be imposed in order to identify the impulse response. The usual 
convention is to adopt a particular ordering using the Choleski decomposition such that 
z_safety does not have a contemporaneous effect on z_reliability10. The identifying 
assumption is that the variables that come earlier in the ordering affect the following 
variables contemporaneously, as well as with lags, while the variables that come later only 
affect the previous variables with lags. In other words, the decomposition forces a potentially 
important asymmetry on the system, and the variables that appear earlier in the system are 
more exogenous and the ones that appear later are more endogenous. Since, in this study, 
there is no theoretical reason to suppose that one variable has no contemporaneous effect on 
the other, the usual practical procedure is to obtain the impulse response function using a 
particular ordering. Compare the results to the impulse function obtained by reversing the 
ordering11. If the implications are quite different, additional investigation into the relationship 
between the variables is necessary (Enders, 2010: 311). To analyze the IRFs I need some 
estimate of their confidence intervals. Following Love and Zicchino (2006), I report standard 
errors of the IRFs by using Monte Carlos simulation to generate the confidence intervals.  
                                                 
10Choleski decomposition of variance/covariance matrix of residuals procedure is equivalent to transforming the 
system in a “recursive” VAR for identification purposes. See Appendix A for the derivations and further 
discussion of impulse-response functions.  
11The main results from PVAR model reported in this study are based on the model with the ordering of safety, 
efficiency, and reliability.  Robustness check shows that models with different orderings give consistent results.  
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The dataset needs to meet two major requirements for the PVAR methodology: 
comparability and stationarity. In order to make the three performance dimensions 
comparable with each other, the original goal variables were time-demeaned. In other words, 
each model-year observation for three indicators was standardized using that year’s mean and 
standard deviation, respectively. Moreover, each of three variables was also found to be 
stationary using a Fisher-type unit root test for panel data12 (further results in Appendix B). 
To ensure the consistency of the reduced-form VAR coefficient estimates, the appropriate lag 
structure needs to be determined. I selected the lag length that minimizes goodness-of-fit 
statistics, specially the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC). I settled on a lag length of one (further results refer to Appendix C).  
Proposition 1, stating that attention allocation is not a question of strictly all or 
nothing, was explored by the significance level of the estimated coefficients. If sequential 
attention is a strict sequence one goal has to be addressed prior to other goals. Hence, the 
coefficients between one goal’s performance and other goals’ past performance will not be 
significantly different from zero. The reason is that if organizations allocate all of their 
attention to one goal at a time, the focal goal variable’s performance will be positive, while 
other goal variables’ performance will drop to zero statistically13 if goals are independent. 
Proposition 2, stating that goals have complex correlation structures, is explored by a 
combination of estimated coefficients and IRF graphs. The estimated coefficients show the 
correlation coefficients of goals, and the IRF graphs visibly show the interdependencies of 
                                                 
12Fisher-type test for unit root does not require strongly balanced data, and the individual series can have gaps 
(Maddala & Wu, 1999).  
13An intuitive example would be that, assume an organization has a constant amount of 100 engineering man-
hours. The strict sequential attention rule will make the organization allocate all 100 engineering man-hours to 
one goal, saying, safety. Then there will be no output of other goals, saying, reliability and fuel efficiency. 
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goals and how one goal variable’s increase will affect other goals’ performance in the 
following period(s).  
To explore Proposition 3 I would like to estimate the growth of each goal variable as 
a function of all goals’ past growth and their attainment discrepancies, with auto model fixed 
effects and size and age effects controlled. This will allow me to observe auto model fixed 
effects and the effect of different goal correlation structures on attention allocation with 
endogeneity of goals controlled. However, current statistical technology does not support 
running VAR model in panel data with control /exogenous variables included. Although the 
VAR test for each auto model (time series data) is allowed to include control variables, there 
is a problem with the length of the time periods. There are only a few auto models with 
enough observations. The VAR test results from those auto models demonstrate the 
difference at the auto model level. Hence, I resort to the next best method as a first order 
approximation, where I could pool data together and run separate regressions of each goal 
variable’s growth on their own attainment discrepancy, the interaction of attainment 
discrepancy with a second goal variable’s status (below/above the aspiration level), and the 
auto model fixed effects. This is consistent with the method in Greve’s (2008) study, where 
he develops the method of interacting each of two goal variables with a dummy variable 
indicating whether the second goal variable has been satisfied specifically to test the 
sequential attention hypothesis. The innovation in this paper is to explore potentially 
different attention allocation patterns for goals with different correlation structures14 and 
possible heterogeneous model level fixed effects. While this method does not solve all the 
                                                 
14I only focus on interaction of attention allocation of any two of the three goals in this study, as the dissertation 
aims to explore whether attention allocation contextually depends on goal correlation structures and individual 
auto models. The interaction effects of three goals will be more interesting and also much more complicated. 
However, as it is beyond the main focus of the dissertation, it is not included in the analysis of the current study. 
Future study could examine the interaction of three goal variables.  
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problems, it appears to be the most feasible solution given the current state of the art. The 
aim of this set of tests is to explore how much variation in attention allocation occurs in the 
auto model level and how much is determined and responded by different goals.  
To be consistent with previous studies (e.g. Chen & Miller, 2007), I incorporate a 
spline for underperforming firms, I1,j,t-1, which equals to 1 if model i’s past performance of 
goal variable j falls below the aspiration level in period t-1. Therefore, (1- I1,j,t-1) indicates 
outperforming models whose past performance meets or exceeds the reference point. I 
estimate the following model 
yi,j,t = a0j + α1jI1,j,t-1 (Pi,j,t-1-Ai,j,t-1) + α2j(1-I1,j,t-1)(Pi,j,t-1-Ai,j,t-1) + 
              α3jI2,j,t-1 + α4jI1,j,t-1 (Pi,j,t-1-Ai,j,t-1) × I2,j,t-1 + α5j(1- I1,j,t-1)(Pi,j,t-1-Ai,j,t-1) × I2,j,t-1 + 
              α6jI3,j,t-1 + α7jI1,j,t-1 (Pi,j,t-1-Ai,j,t-1) × I3,j,t-1 + α8j(1- I1,j,t-1)(Pi,j,t-1-Ai,j,t-1) × I3,j,t-1 +   
              a9jci + a10jmi + a11jyri + εi,j,t                                                                                 (2) 
where yi,j,t designates model i’s growth/change of goal variable j in period t. The growth is 
measured as the first difference of goal variable performance. Pi,j,t-1 is the measure of 
individual model i’s performance of goal variable j in period t-1. Ai,j,t-1 is the measure of 
model i’s aspiration level of goal variable j in period t-1. I2,j,t-1 and I3,j,t-1 are dummy variables 
indicating whether a second or a third goal’s performance is below the aspiration level in 
period t-1. The model includes dummy variables for auto models (mi) and years (yri), and 
control variables (ci) including model size and age. The use of lagged independent variables 
reflects the temporal ordering in the causal arguments.  εi,j,t is the error term.  
Proposition 3, stating that attention allocation is context dependent, is explored in two 
ways. First, I investigate whether there is a systematic attention shifting rule across multiple 
OLS regression models with three pairs of goals (causality can flow one or two ways). 
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Specifically, the level of significance and the signs of the main effect and interaction 
variables are compared (more details refer to the next section). Second, I compare the values 
of partial eta-squares of the regression models with and without the auto model fixed effects 
to examine whether the fit of the regression model has been improved significantly. Note that, 
the concept “attention” in this project falls into the category of attentional selection in 
Ocasio's ( 2011) framework. Consistent with Greve (2008), attention is inferred from shifts in 
aspiration levels among goals. 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
 
5.1   Descriptive Statistics  
Table 4 displays the descriptive statistics including means and standard deviations for 
all variables and their correlations. The industry average of fuel economy becomes lower in 
later 1990s when more automakers started to introduce compact pickups and SUVs. It is not 
surprising that means of the three Z scores (standard scores) and attainment discrepancies are 
zero. The correlation table yields no surprises, with the highest correlations being seen in 
predictable places. Each goal variable is highly positively related to their own Z score and 
attainment discrepancy. Efficiency is positively related to reliability. Safety is positively 
associated with model size and age. Both efficiency and reliability are negatively related to 
model size and age. 
To graphically show the interplay among the three performance dimensions  (fuel 
economy, safety, and reliability), for each of them, I first calculate the industry average using 
the performance of all auto models for a specific year, and then transform each industry-year 
observation into that year’s percent deviation (positive/negative) from the industry mean over 
the time periods being estimated. Figure 1 charts on one graph the average deviations of fuel 
economy, safety, and reliability over time. It is difficult to see any consistent correlation 
among fuel economy, safety, and reliability. There was a striking rise in fuel economy in 
1981 that occurred at the same time as a drop in safety. This mainly resulted from the 
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Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) regulation and the increased price of oil in the 
late 1970s. There was another strike rise in fuel economy in 1989 that occurred at the same 
time as a drop in reliability. Fuel economy and safety are mainly distributed as consistently 
below and above the zero line (industry mean over time) after 1996 respectively.  The 
relationship between safety and reliability is not clear from the figure. There is a spike in 
reliability in 1982 that is associated with a drop in safety in 1981. Similarly, there is a drop in 
reliability in 2003 followed by a spike in safety in 2004. The relationship between fuel 
economy and reliability is also not clear from Figure 1.   
5.2   Panel Vector Autoregression Analysis  
Table 5 shows the estimates from the PVAR model15. The model with lag one length 
entails the estimation of as many as nine coefficients. As is common in VAR analysis, I forgo 
a discussion of the specific coefficients in this section.  
A first observation is that all series exhibit positive autocorrelation – this is shown 
along the diagonal of the coefficient matrix for lag one. This is as expected. The positive 
autocorrelation means the current allocation of attention continues strongly for at least a 
period, and the shift of attention does not occur quickly if it occurs. The results also show 
some significant correlation among goals as shown by the off diagonal coefficients (e.g., 
safety is negatively related to efficiency at the previous period (-.34), and reliability is 
positively related to efficiency at the previous period (.16)).  These results support 
Proposition 1 stating that attention allocation is not a question of all or nothing, where a goal 
draws either all or no attention. Organizations attend to multiple goals with nondiscretionary 
or a minimum level of attention at any time and they shift their allocation of discretionary 
                                                 
15The impulse response results are estimated using STATA code written by Inessa Love from the World Bank. 
For these estimates, the data were demeaned by year, eliminating the time specific shocks. The demeaning by 
time did not reintroduce model-level fixed effects.  
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attention to goals across time. In other words, attention allocation is not a strict sequence in 
which one goal has to be addressed prior to other goals, but instead it takes the form of 
shifting the distribution of attention, especially discretionary attention, across multiple goals. 
The dynamic relationships estimated in this PVAR are best illustrated by graphing 
IRFs as discussed in Chapter 4. Figure 2 charts the response to a unit increase (one-year, one-
standard-deviation positive shock, hereafter referred to simply as a shock) in period zero over 
the following six-year period. The units on the vertical axis show the dependent variable’s 
response (unit change) in each year. The middle line is the point estimates of the response, 
and the top and the bottom lines show the 90 percent confidence interval around that estimate, 
created using bootstrap standard errors with five hundred repetitions. The responses in IRFs 
show how a variable is affected in a given year.  
Generally speaking, a goal variable’s responses to shocks in other goal variables are 
very different in magnitude and shape. The responses of variables to shocks, not 
unexpectedly, decline and return to the zero line over several periods. However, the details of 
the path back to equilibrium vary.  The responses of variables to their own shocks decline 
faster than the responses of variables to the shocks of other variables. As shown along the 
diagonal of Figure 2 (row 1 column 1; row 2 column 2; row 3 column 3), the responses of 
variables to their own shocks are consistently positive as expected. As seen in row 1 columns 
2 and 3, the responses of safety to efficiency and reliability shocks are negative as suggested 
by the corresponding coefficients in the PVAR16. As seen in row 2 column 3, the response of 
efficiency to the reliability shock is also negative. As seen in row 3 column 2, the response of 
reliability to the efficiency shock has some time lag, but turns positive after two periods. This 
                                                 
16The response of safety to reliability shock is significantly negative in the subsequent three periods, and then 
decays to zero.  
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delay raises interesting issue regarding organizational response times.  As seen in row 2 
column 1, and row 3 column 1, the responses of efficiency and reliability to the safety shock 
are not significantly different from zero in any period. These results show that the responses 
of one goal variable to their own or other goal variables’ shock vary in direction (sign), 
magnitude (significance), and response time. Also for any pair of goals, the response of one 
goal to another goal’s shock can be unidirectional. For instance, the response of safety to the 
efficiency shock is negative, while efficiency does not significantly respond to the safety 
shock. This also suggests that the response of goals imply directional causality not just 
association between goals.  
In summary, the combination of correlation estimates from Table 5 and 
heterogeneous responses of goal variables to the shocks in Figure 2 clearly suggest that goals 
have complex correlation and causality structures, as stated in Proposition 2. Goals within 
organizations have different levels of interdependency. They may be congruent, divergent or 
independent. This calls into question the practice of analyzing goals separately. 
5.3   Ordinary Least Squares Analysis  
I regress the growth of different goal variables on their corresponding attainment 
discrepancies, the second goal’s dummy variable indicating whether its performance is below 
the aspiration level, their interaction terms17,  and control variables including auto model size, 
age, and year effects. Table 6 reports the results of the above models. To show the variance 
explained by auto model fixed effects, Table 7 reports the results based on the three full 
models including auto model dummy variables. Including model dummy variables into the 
original models significantly improves the Adjusted R-square of the OLS regressions. The 
                                                 
17Interaction variables are evaluated by an F-test of their joint significance for each model. For the space 
concern, I only report the regression results from full models. More results are available upon request.  
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three full models as reported in Table 7 have a significantly better fit with the data than the 
models described in Table 6. The results from the Likelihood-ratio test of the three pairs of 
models are as follows: LR chi2 (137) = 170.63 (Prob > chi2 = 0.0271), LR chi2 (132) = 170.37 
(Prob > chi2 = 0.0137), LR chi2 (138) = 376.88 (Prob > chi2 = 0.0000). Therefore, I interpret 
the results based on the full models as reported in Table 7. 
There are some general results such as one goal variable’s performance is negatively 
related to its growth no matter if the goal variable is above or below the aspiration level 
(refer to the estimated coefficients from row 3 to row 8). This is consistent with the argument 
that problemistic search changes as a continuous function of the performance level (Bromiley, 
1991; Lant et al., 1992). The strength of the reaction varies depending on whether 
performance is above or below the aspiration level (Greve, 1998; Kahaneman & Tversky, 
1979). The goal is less likely to be active in firms with the performance of that goal variable 
above the aspiration level, so the relation between a goal variable and its growth becomes 
weaker.  
Specifically, Model 1 explores the efficiency growth as a function of the efficiency 
attainment discrepancy and its interaction with safety and reliability indicators (with one as 
the indicator of their performance below the aspiration level). If safety/reliability draws 
attention away from the efficiency goal when they are below the aspiration levels, then the 
interaction variables will have opposite signs to the main effect of the attainment discrepancy 
of efficiency, and will thus weaken the main effects. This will suggest the modified non-strict 
sequential attention rule stating that organizations attribute less discretionary attention to 
efficiency when the safety/reliability goal is not satisfied. If safety/reliability draws attention 
toward the efficiency goal when they are below the aspiration levels, then the interaction 
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variables will have the same signs as the main effects of the attainment discrepancy of 
efficiency and thus will strengthen the main effects. This will suggest the goal activation rule 
in which efficiency and safety/reliability are causally linked in goal hierarchies/priority in 
such a way that fulfillment of efficiency helps organizations fulfill safety/reliability (March 
& Simon, 1958). The results from Model 1show that safety draws attention toward the 
efficiency goal when both safety and efficiency goals are not met (coefficients of rows 3 and 
12 have the same signs), while safety draws attention away from efficiency when the 
efficiency goal is met but the safety goal is not met (coefficients of rows 4 and 13 have 
opposite signs). Therefore, the activation model is used when both the efficiency and the 
safety goals are not satisfied, and the modified sequential attention model is used when the 
efficiency goal is met, but the safety goal is not met. This suggests that there could be 
heterogeneous attention allocation patterns for the same pair of goals when they have 
different attainment discrepancies. The results from Model 1 also show that there is no 
interaction between the efficiency and reliability goals as the interaction effects (coefficients 
of rows 14 and 15) are not significant.  
Model 2 explores the safety growth as a function of the safety attainment discrepancy 
and its interaction with efficiency and reliability indicators (with one indicating their 
performance below the aspiration level). The results show that efficiency draws attention 
away from safety when both the safety and efficiency goals are not met (coefficients of rows 
5 and 16 have opposite signs). This is consistent with the results from Model 1 that when the 
efficiency growth is considered as the dependent variable, the activation rule is adopted as 
efficiency draws attention away from safety when both the safety and efficiency goals are not 
met. This implicitly indicates the higher priority of efficiency than that of safety. I also find 
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there is no interaction between the two goals when the safety goal is met but the efficiency 
goal is not met (coefficient of row 17 is not significant). The results from Model 2 also show 
that there is no interaction between safety and reliability as the interaction effects 
(coefficients of rows 18 and 19) are not significant. Similarly, Model 3 explores the 
reliability growth as a function of the reliability attainment discrepancy and its interactions 
with efficiency and safety. The results from Model 3 show that efficiency draws attention 
away from reliability when the reliability goal is met but the efficiency goal is not 
(coefficients of row 8 and 21 have opposite signs), while there is no interaction between two 
goals when both goals are not met (coefficients of row 22 is not significant). The results from 
Model 3 also show that there is no interaction between reliability and safety as the interaction 
effects (coefficients of rows 22 and 23) are not significant. Overall, the interaction between 
the reliability goal and the other two goals is not as intense as that between safety and 
efficiency. These results are hardly observed from the correlations as shown in Table 4.  
Table 8 summarizes the heterogeneous attention allocation patterns for three pairs of 
goals (causality can flow one or two ways). Overall, the results suggest that there are 
different patterns of attention allocation among multiple goals with varying degrees of 
interdependencies. Attention allocated to a goal variable depends on its own attainment 
discrepancy interacting with the attention allocation pattern which in turn is determined by 
the focal goal variable’s interdependencies with other goal variables. Therefore, the overall 
effects of goal variables’ attainment discrepancies on their growth are heterogeneous. This is 
important and very different from current approach.  
Moreover, the significant improvement of fit of the full models suggests the huge 
effect of individual automobile models on attention allocation. Table 9 reports the descriptive 
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statistics from the model fixed effect coefficients from OLS regressions. Noteworthy is that 
the magnitude, sign, and significance level of fixed effect coefficients completely depend on 
the choice of the base model, the auto model dropped in the regression analysis. Changing 
the base model will shift all fixed effect coefficients toward the same direction with the same 
magnitude. The results in Table 9 are based on the fact that the auto model with the medium 
effect was dropped in each regression model18. Therefore, the fixed effect coefficients in this 
table should be interpreted as the difference from the base model in each regression model. 
 Figure 3 further plots the frequency distribution of fixed effect coefficients from 
regressions. Roughly speaking, individual auto models show strong heterogeneity in 
allocating discretionary attention to the same set of goals. This is different from the 
assumption of homogeneity that is inevitably made in current literature. I also observe that 
auto model fixed effects in Models 3 are more dispersed with a larger standard deviation of 
coefficients compared with Models 1and 2. This suggests that auto models have stronger 
fixed effects on the growth of reliability. 
Overall, the combination of the heterogeneity of attention shifting rules among three 
equations with different goals of varying interdependence, and the heterogeneous auto model 
fixed effects on attention allocation for the same sets of goals, suggests that attention 
allocation is context dependent, supporting Proposition 3. The control variable size and age 
show different levels of significance in different regression models. Age is found to be 
positively related to the growth of safety. This is reasonable, as auto models lasting longer 
tend to focus more on safety.               
                                                 
18Specifically, Honda Odyssey in regression model 1, Oldsmobile Bravada in regression model 2, and Hyundai 
Elantra in regression model 3 were dropped. 
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5.4   Robustness Analyses   
I also performed several changes in specification in order to assess the robustness of 
the models and results discussed above. As the panel VAR model is sufficient to test the 
interplay of three goal variables as illustrated in Propositions 1 and 2, this section mainly 
focuses on the robustness analyses on the test of Proposition 3. 
5.4.1   Alternative measures 
The social aspiration employed in above analyses is based on the average 
performance of all auto models in the same category (e.g. small cars) as the focal model. 
Though this measure is much more refined compared to those used in most previous studies, 
I ran the robust check using an alternative measure of social aspirations. Research has 
observed upward striving as a possible social reference point. Upward striving is the setting 
of aspiration levels higher than nominally expected in behavioral theory. For instance, 
Bromiley (1991) adds an adjustment factor of 1.05 for firms performing above their 
aspiration level in his study of corporate risk taking. While this adjustment approach is used 
in only a few studies (e.g. Deephouse & Wiseman, 2000), it is consistent with Cyert and 
March’s (1963:34) statement: “[I]n the steady state, aspiration level exceeds achievement by 
a small amount.” However, this elevation varies over time and across industries. To be 
consistent with Massini, Lewin, and Greve's (2005) argument that innovating firms are more 
likely to select other innovating firms as their reference group and imitating firms are more 
likely to select the average firm in the population, I created an alternative measure of the 
social aspiration, in which high performing players (whose performance is above the 
category average) select the 75th percentile of the performers within the category as their 
reference group and low performing players(whose performance is below the category 
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average)  select the average performance as their reference point. I then ran the same analysis 
as in Section 5.3.  
Table 10 offers a robustness check using the alternative measure of the social 
aspiration level. The general prediction that one goal variable’s performance is negatively 
related to its growth is only confirmed in Model 2. Surprisingly, negative attainment 
discrepancies of fuel efficiency and reliability are found to be positively related to their 
growth, which implies that the lower the fuel efficiency/reliability, the less likely decision 
makers will activate that goal. This puzzling results, but might be explained by the fact that 
three quarters of auto models are underperforming relative to their goals, as low performing 
players set the average as their goals and high performing players set the 75th percentile 
performance as their goals. This change causes a significant drop of the sample size due to 
the substantial number of missing values of dummy variables indicating the positive 
attainment discrepancy of goal variables and thus their interaction terms. 
Specifically, the results from Model 1show that safety draws attention away from the 
efficiency goal when both the safety and efficiency goals are not met (coefficients of rows 3 
and 12 have opposite signs), while there is no interaction between two goals when the 
efficiency goal is met but the safety goal is not met (coefficient of row 4 is not significant). 
Therefore, the modified sequential attention model is used when both the efficiency goal and 
the safety goal are not met. The results from Model 1 also show that there is no interaction 
between the efficiency and reliability goals as the interaction effects are not significant. The 
results from Model 2 show that efficiency draws attention away from safety when both the 
safety and efficiency goals are not met (coefficients of rows 5 and 16 have opposite signs), 
while there is no interaction between two goals when the safety goal is met but the efficiency 
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goal is not met. The results from Model 2 also show that reliability draws attention away 
from safety when the safety goal is met but the reliability goal is not met (coefficients of 
rows 6 and 19 have opposite signs), while there is no interaction between two goals when 
both goals are not met. The results from Model 3 show that efficiency draws attention away 
from reliability when both goals are not met (coefficients of row 8 and 21 have opposite 
signs), while there is no interaction between two goals when the reliability goal is met but the 
efficiency goal is not. There is no interaction between reliability and safety as the interaction 
effects are not significant.  
Table 11 summarizes the heterogeneous attention allocation patterns for three pairs of 
goals (causality can flow one or two ways) using the alternative measure of social aspirations. 
The distribution of attention allocation patterns of three pairs of goals is different from that in 
Table 8, however, overall, the results confirm Proposition 3 that there are different patterns 
of attention allocation among multiple goals with varying degrees of interdependencies. 
Another interesting finding is that organizations only use the sequential attention rule in 
attention allocation when they generally set high social aspiration levels using the upward 
striving mechanism.  
5.4.2   Control variables 
A broad range of indicators are considered for inclusion as control variables. The 
industry size is included as a control for the investment opportunities available to the auto 
models. It is measured as the sum of all auto models’ revenues for a specific year. The 
company-level financial performance is included. It is measured as ROA using the data from 
COMPUSTAT. The following nameplate-level control variables are included: nameplate size 
is the logarithms of total revenues within each nameplate. Product line number is the number 
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of products manufactured within a nameplate such as Lexus in Toyota Motor Corp. Niche 
count is the number of niches in which a nameplate offers products and is calculated by the 
number of categories. Diversified firms may compete less aggressively in each market niche 
than firms that are committed to few niches (Chen, 1996). To account for this effect, I enter 
the level of diversification as one minus a Herfindahl index of its distribution of own 
revenues across the product lines. Similarly, firms may compete less aggressively when they 
have a high level of contact with others in multiple markets (Gimeno, 1999; Gimeno & Woo, 
1996). To control for this effect, I include the average multimarket contact (MMC) of the 
focal nameplate with all its competitors (Baum & Korn, 1996). I formed this measure by 
taking, for each multimarket competitor (each firm a focal firm competes in at least two 
markets), the proportion of focal firm markets in which the competitor is also present. This 
proportion was averaged over all multimarket competitors to generate the average 
multimarket contact of the focal firm. I also control another model-level variable model price 
as the manufacturer’s suggested retail price.  
The results based on the models including all above control variables are presented in 
Table 12. The main results stay robust except that in Model 2 there is no interaction between 
the safety goal and the efficiency goal. Most control variables are found to not significantly 
affect the goal variable growth. Niche count is positively related to the efficiency growth, 
suggesting that the more niches a nameplate focuses on, the more likely the efficiency of the 
model within that nameplate grows. MMC negatively relates to the reliability growth, 
implying that the more multimarket contacts a nameplate has, the less likely it will grow their 
reliability. This is consistent with the argument that firms with high levels of MMC are less 
likely to behave aggressively. Industry size is negatively related to the growth of both safety 
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and reliability, suggesting that when the market size grows, the auto models tend to focus 
less on the improvement of safety and reliability.  
5.4.3   Alternative statistical method – Hierarchical linear model 
Automobile models are nested in automobile nameplates and nameplates are nested in 
automobile companies. Specifically, the variables in above analyses are at multiple levels. 
The goal variables are at the auto model level, other variables such as the nameplate size and 
diversification level are at the nameplate level, and still other variables including financial 
performance ROA are at the company level. Given this characteristic, a natural concern is 
how these level issues influence organizational research (e.g. Rousseau, 1985). The literature 
(e.g. Hofmann & Gavin, 1998) has suggested that the relationships across levels of analysis 
are best described in the context of hierarchical linear models (HLM). HLMs, also known as 
“multilevel models”, “random coefficient models”, or “mixed effects” models, allow 
researchers to analyze hierarchically nested data with two or more levels. In a HLM, varied 
covariance structures can be imposed on the residuals based on the nature of the data. If there 
appear variances in an outcome to be explained by second-level or higher-level variables, as 
possibly seen from the data with nested structure in this study, HLM has advantages over 
standard multiple regression and other statistical methods because HLM can analyze 
multilevel data (Draper, 1995) and incorporate the heteroscedasticity and dependence into the 
model. For instance, HLM provides a mathematical form that allows researchers to 
investigate the underlying theory about the functional relationship among the variables in 
each level (Heck & Thomas, 2000).  
A two-level hierarchical linear model can be illustrated as: at level-1, a within group 
model is estimated separately for each group. In this analysis, an individual level outcome is 
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regressed on the individual level predictor(s). The parameter estimates from the first level 
(i.e., slopes and incepts) are then used as outcome variables in the level-2 analysis in which 
they are modeled as a function of group level variables. This basic model can be formulated 
as follows: 
Level-1:               Yij = β0j + β1jXij + rij                                                           (3) 
Level-2:               βoj = γ00 + γ01Gj + U0j                                                       (4)    
                             β1j = γ10 + γ11Gj + U1j                                                       (5)             
where Yij is the individual level outcome variable, Xij is the individual score on a given 
individual level variable, and Gj  is a group level variable with the value for the group 
assigned down to each group member. β0j and β1j are level-1 intercepts and slopes, 
respectively, estimated separately for each group (noted by the subscript j); γ00 and γ10 are the 
level-2 intercepts terms, and γ01 and γ11 are the level-2 slopes relating to the intercept and 
slope terms from the level-1 equation, respectively. rij, U0, and U1j are the level-1 and level-2 
residuals. Equation 4 represents the main effect of Gj on Yij and equation 5 represents the 
interaction of Gj and Xij. 
Hierarchical linear models are random coefficient models in the sense that the level-1 
parameters are allowed to vary across groups. Furthermore, the variance and covariance of 
the level-2 residuals, or the variance components, are also estimated (Bryk & Raudenbush, 
1992). This approach differs from the traditional OLS approach where all of the regression 
parameters are fixed and level-2 variance components are not separable from the individual 
level residual.  
Table 13 reports the results from HLM tests. Only in Model 3 hierarchical linear 
regression provides better fit with the data than the OLS regression (Prob > Chi2 = .0000). 
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The results stay robust in HLM tests, except for a slight difference in the significance level 
(e.g., from .005 to .001 level) for some variables. Table 14 further reports the random-effect 
parameters of company, nameplates, and model, and the variance partition across levels. 
Specifically, for safety growth, roughly 3.2% of the variance is attributable to the company 
level, and 0.3% to the nameplate level. Noteworthily, for reliability growth, a huge amount of 
variance, 21.9%, is attributable to the company level, 1.2% to the nameplate level, and 1.8% 
to the model level. This implies that attention to reliability largely depends on the company 
level decision making. This is also consistent with the results in Table 7 that inclusion of auto 
model fixed effects into OLS regression of reliability growth improves the Adjusted R-square 
most significantly.  
  
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
EXTENSION TEST 
 
The above chapters have suggested the complex nature of attention shifts, issues 
caused by the correlation structures of multiple goals, and context dependence of attention 
shifts. The details of these results provide important insights and suggest the necessity of a 
substantial extension and modification of the theory of attention allocation. In particular it 
turns out that the rules of switching attention are likely to depend in part on the 
organizational characteristics.  This chapter focuses on some possible extension of the above 
analyses. Specifically, in this chapter I explore the interplay of three goals at a more 
disaggregated level. I examine whether attention allocation processes are constrained by 
organizational characteristics such as size, age, and geography. 
Managers allocate their attention following various rules (March & Shapira, 1992; 
Ocasio, 1997). Two factors are proposed to determine the attention allocation pattern in this 
chapter. The first is the capability to attend to the goal(s). The second is the willingness to 
attend to the goal(s). I focus on how three factors – organizational size, age, and geography – 
affect the ability and the willingness of organizational attention to goals.  
6.1   Propositions 
6.1.1   Size as a moderator 
The behavioral theory of the firm suggests that slack resources are important to 
resolving the conflicts among divergent goals (Cyert & March, 1963). Empirical studies 
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explicitly refer to firm size as an indicator of a firm’s current resource endowment. For 
example, Mitchell (1994) suggests that “larger businesses tend to have larger pools of 
financial and managerial resources that help overcome problems that threaten their survival” 
(Mitchell, 1994: 577). Large firm size also increases the potential to attract additional 
resources. Large firms have advantages in raising capital, face better tax conditions and 
government regulations, and are in better position to compete for qualified labor (Brüderl & 
Schüssler, 1990). Therefore, large resource endowment could meet more competing demands 
from different goals, and increases firms’ capability to attend to more than one goal at a time. 
Similarly, as automobile companies tend to allocate more resources to the auto models with a 
large volume of sales to keep it continuously successful, resource slack allows auto models 
with large size to attend to multiple goals simultaneously. By contrast, small organizations 
are associated with a small stock of resources, which will intensify the competition and 
conflicts among multiple goals, and thus they are less capable to attend to multiple goals 
simultaneously.  
Moreover, empirical evidence also shows that small firm size increases the 
probability of firm failure because a small stock of resources makes firms more vulnerable 
(Bruderl & Schussler, 1990; Dobrev, 2001; Mitchell, 1994). For example, small firms are 
more vulnerable to a random shock such as the loss of an important client (Levinthal, 1991). 
This vulnerability manifests itself as risk of either bankruptcy or of becoming a takeover 
target. Therefore, small firms are less likely to take risk or change (Audia & Greve, 2006; 
Greve, 2010). Switching attention from one goal to another may involve a strategic 
reorientation of the organization in addition to the subunit at the auto model level, thus it is a 
risky move by the organizations per se. Therefore, auto models with a small volume of sales 
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are less willing to switch attention among different goals but more likely to be persistent with 
their goal(s) than large organizations.  I propose that 
Proposition 4: Large organizations allocate their attention to multiple goals 
differently than small ones. The resource slack associated with size allows large 
organizations to adopt multiple attention allocation rules at the same time. Small 
organizations are more likely to suffer from the lack of resource slack, therefore, they are 
more likely to be persistent in their attention allocation to goal(s), and less likely to 
simultaneously attend to multiple goals or frequently shift attention among goals. In 
summary, goals in large organizations show a higher level of interaction in terms of 
competition for attention than in small ones. 
6.1.2   Age as a moderator 
With increasing age organizations become generally larger and often have greater 
slack resources (Ranger-Moore, 1997). Slack resources can absorb potential inconsistencies 
among divergent goals (Cyert & March, 1963; Thompson, 1967) and tolerate the risk of 
shifting attention among goals. Thus, older organizations are more likely to attend to multiple 
goals simultaneously and more often to shift their attention among goals. In addition, young 
auto models may carry entrepreneurial persistence or stubbornness (e.g., Gatewood, Shaver, 
& Gartner, 1995; Wu, Dagher, & others, 2007). Therefore, they are less likely to shift 
attention among goals. Hence, I suggest the following proposition:  
Proposition 5: Older organizations allocate their attention to multiple goals 
differently than younger ones. The resource slack associated with age allows older 
organizations to adopt multiple attention allocation rules at the same time. Younger 
organizations are more likely to be persistent in their attention allocation to goal(s), and less 
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likely to frequently shift attention among goals. In summary, goals in older organizations 
show a higher level of interaction in terms of competition for attention than in younger ones. 
6.1.3   Geography as a moderator 
Institutional theorists have shown how organizational attention is structured by the 
institutional logics prevailing in the environment (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). External 
factors, such as country cultural institutions and economic institutions (e.g., regulatory 
regimes) may be moderating the attention shifts among goals within organizations. Grouzet 
et al. (2005) indicate countries’ cultures influence goal aspirations (goal importance) at an 
individual level. Thus, it is likely that the attention allocation pattern among goals for auto 
models belonging to US and non-US automobile companies would vary. Therefore, I propose 
Proposition 6: Goals within domestic (U.S.) auto models show a different level of 
interaction in terms of competition for attention than those within international (Non-U.S.) 
auto models. 
6.2   Analysis Results 
Similar to the OLS model used in Section 4.3, I regress the growth of different goal 
variables on their corresponding attainment discrepancies, the second goal’s dummy variable 
indicating whether its performance is below the aspiration level, their interaction terms,  and 
control variables including auto model size, age, and year effects. To test Propositions 4 and 
5, I split the sample into two groups according to the median of auto models’ size and age. 
To test Proposition 6, I split the sample into two subgroups, one with domestic auto models 
and the other international auto models. For the simplicity and readability of the dissertation, 
I only report in Table 15 the summary of attention shifting rules for different subgroups.  
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The results show that large organizations use both the modified sequential attention 
rule and the activation rule in attention allocation. More interaction occurs between the fuel 
efficiency and safety goals. For small organizations, there is no interaction between any pair 
of goals. This implies that large organizations allocate their attention to multiple goals 
differently from small ones. The resource slack associated with size allows large 
organizations to adopt multiple attention allocation rules at the same time. Small 
organizations are more likely to suffer from the lack of resource slack, therefore, they are 
more likely to be persistent in their goal(s), and less likely to simultaneously attend to 
multiple goals or frequently shift attention among goals. Overall, goals in large organizations 
show a higher level of interaction in terms of competition for attention than in small ones, 
supporting Proposition 4.  
Similar patterns are found between older and younger subgroups. Older organizations 
allocate their attention to multiple goals differently from younger ones. The resource slack 
associated with age allows older organizations to adopt both the modified sequential attention 
rule and the activation rule in attention allocation. Younger organizations are more likely to 
be persistent in their goal(s), and less likely to frequently shift attention among goals. In sum, 
goals in older organizations show a higher level of interaction in terms of competition for 
attention than in younger ones, supporting Proposition 5.  
The results also suggest that domestic and international auto models show different 
attention allocation patterns, and their goals are with different levels of interaction in terms of 
competition for attention, confirming Proposition 6. A close examination of the results, for 
instance, suggests that domestic and international auto models use different attention shifting 
rules between the fuel efficiency goal and the other two goals. Specifically, for domestic auto 
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models, when the efficiency goal is met, they tend to shift their attention away from 
efficiency to safety/reliability, while when the efficiency goal is not met, there is no 
interaction between efficiency and safety/reliability. For international auto models, when 
efficiency is met, they tend to shift their attention away from efficiency to safety, however, 
when both efficiency and safety goals are not met, they will draw attention from safety 
toward efficiency. This implicitly indicates the relatively higher priority of the efficiency 
goal than the safety goal for international auto models. This high priority of efficiency may 
come from the society as a contextual factor that the gasoline price is generally higher in 
Asia and Europe than in US. 
6.3   Discussion 
This chapter extends the main tests in the dissertation by investigating some possible 
moderators of attention allocation. The results suggest that organizational size, age, and 
geography affect managerial attention allocation to multiple goals. This further confirms the 
third proposition stating that attention allocation is context dependent. Not to forget that, this 
research is exploratory in nature since empirical studies involving more than two goals have 
not previously been conducted, and lack a theoretical basis regarding sequential choice.   
The details of these results provide some conjectures regarding some aspects a new 
theory might include. These preliminary rules may direct future studies at formal testing of 
these conjectures, though at this point the outlines of a new theory are still vague regarding 
the detailed choice of the next goal for attention when there are more than two goals.
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, I explore the long-run interplay of multiple goals and attention 
allocation to them within organizations from the behavior perspective. In so doing, I address 
three questions associated with attention allocation: first, what is the long run relationship of 
multiple goals within organization? Second, how do organizations allocate their limited 
attention to multiple potentially conflicting goals? Third, is sequential attention sufficient to 
explain and guide attention allocation to multiple goals? Or is attention allocation context 
dependent? In empirical tests where I investigate the interplay of three product goals 
(efficiency, safety, and reliability) using the longitudinal data from the US automotive 
industry, combing panel vector autoregression and OLS regression as a first order 
approximation, I find some major results including the complex nature of attention shifts, 
issues caused by the correlation structures of multiple goals, and context dependence of 
attention allocation. 
This research is associated with several inter-related contributions to strategic 
management and organization theory and implications to practice. It is also associated with 
several limitations, which future research may address. I first elaborate on potential 
contributions and implications as follows. 
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7.1    Contributions and Implications 
7.1.1   Contributions to organizational theory on goals 
The first contribution associated with this research is linked with organizational 
theory on goals. First, the observation that organizations seek to meet aspiration levels for 
multiple goal variables has long been part of organizational theory (Cyert & March, 1963). 
Organizations pursue multiple goals which are empirically negatively related (Meyer, 2002). 
The complexity involved in attending to simultaneous claims in many different arenas and 
calculating both substantive and symbolic costs and benefits calls for a behavioral theory of 
attention (March & Olsen, 1976). However, in spite of this theory and the theory that 
multiple goals compete for limited attention of organizations, empirical research on 
organizational goals or aspirations has mainly focused on a single goal and how the 
consequences of performance relative to the aspiration level motivate various organizational 
activities. There is still a missing link of theoretical and empirical examination of the context 
through which multiple potentially conflicting goals interplay and compete for attention 
within organizations over time. This study makes a start toward a theory of how managers 
allocate and manage their attention among multiple goals within firms by exploring the long-
run relationship and competitive interaction among them over time. Such theory is needed 
because many organizational goals are related through competition for attention, in which 
fulfilling one goal makes another or others more problemistic. The ignorance of research on 
how decision makers respond to multiple goals, especially when there are more than two, or 
diverging performance obscures the potential efficacy of the performance feedback in 
decision making (there is extensive evidence that past performance relative to the aspiration 
level determines organizational subsequent actions), as decision makers encounter ambiguity 
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in deciding which goal or performance dimension to attend to determine their success or 
failure. A single decision may freeze managerial action when it improves one performance 
goal at the expense of other goals (Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2009).The finding that car safety, fuel 
efficiency, and reliability goal variables dynamically interact with each other over time is 
important because it empirically supports the need for new theory development and more 
empirical study of goal structures when there are more than two goals.  
Secondly, while acknowledging that organizations have a broad set of goals, most of 
the extant studies have focused on financial performance goals but ignored other important 
performance goals such as production efficiency and quality. Although financial performance 
goals are clearly important for explaining organizational behaviors as they are widely 
considered as ends, it is worthwhile to consider other goals as means by which financial 
performance goals are achieved. This study examines the interplay of three product level 
goals – car safety, reliability, and fuel efficiency. This greatly enhances our understanding of 
organizational goals that are of considerable importance to financial performance.   
Thirdly, a key concern of the Carnegie School is the relationship between individual 
and firm-level goals (Gavetti, Levinthal, &Ocasio, 2007). Hierarchy is presented as an 
instrument for firms to reconcile individual and firm-level goals (Simon, 1947) so that 
problems that exceed individual limitations can be decomposed and solved. Firm-level goals 
are constructed by managers and assigned to other managers or workers. The goals of the 
subunits within the firms connect the firm level and individual level goals, and thus play a 
key role in directing the character and the strategic direction of firms. However, the extant 
literature on goals in strategy, management, and psychology has mainly focused on either the 
individual level or the firm level, and the intermediate level – subunit level analysis has been 
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significantly lost in the literature. This study casts light on the dynamics of the selection of 
subunit goal and multiple levels of analysis (e.g. Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981) by 
examining how subunit managers at the auto model level set their goals and allocate their 
attention to them subsequently.  
7.1.2   Contributions to behavioral theory and attention theory 
A second contribution concerns the behavior theory and attention theory. First, BTOF 
(Cyert & March, 1963) suggests organizations, with the sequential attention rule, allocate 
attention to the problemistic area and then shift their attention to the next problemistic area 
when the first one is solved. However, through the exploratory examination of the 
automotive industry, the long-term dynamic relationships among the three goal variables 
(safety, reliability, and fuel efficiency) show that goal variables are correlated to others’ past 
performance. This implies that the nature of attention shifting is not a question of all or 
nothing, where a goal draws either all or zero managerial attention. This suggests that 
sequential attention (Cyert & March, 1963) is not sufficient to explain or guide the attention 
allocation among more than two goals. BTOF argues sequential attention is a form of quasi-
resolution of conflict that lets decision makers treat different goals as constraints to be 
satisfied in some order of priority rather than as trade-offs that have to be weighed against 
each other. However, the results from this exploratory study show that sequential attention is 
not a strict sequence in which one goal has to be addressed prior to other goals, but instead it 
takes the form of shifting the distribution of attention, especially discretionary attention, 
across multiple goals. This further indicates the necessity of a modification of the current 
theory. An obvious and seemingly reasonable extension would be that attention has both 
discretionary and nondiscretionary components. Organizations attend to multiple goals with 
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nondiscretionary attention simultaneously and shift their allocation of discretionary attention 
among goals across time. 
Secondly, while it has been suggested that attention allocation is context dependent 
(Ocasio, 1997), sequential attention to goals is the only major theory on multiple goals in the 
literature. There is a lack of empirical investigation of the possible heterogeneous attention 
allocation patterns and consequently the potential contextual factors of attention allocation. 
For instance, scholars have suggested firms’ patterns of resource allocation may be related to 
their strategies (Bower, 1986). It is possible that firms prefers allocating their attention to the 
highly performing dimensions above the aspiration level to allocating their efforts to 
underperforming dimensions to match others, because they desire to differentiate themselves 
from their competitors by not being in sync with rivals (e.g. Katila &Chen, 2008). Vissa et al. 
(2010) suggest a need to add consideration of organizational form and governance into 
organizational attention allocation. Also, organizations may focus on multiple goals if they 
possess slack or focus on no goal if the failure to reach goals is of large magnitude or persists 
for a long time (Greve, 2008). It is an extremely important but challenging task to examine 
what factors enhance or inhibit the successful attainment of multiple goals and how goals 
should be attended to avoid conflict (Locke & Latham, 1990). 
This study unfolds and tests the contextual dependence of attention allocation in three 
ways. First, it shows goals within organizations have complex correlation structures. Goals 
may be congruent, divergent, or independent, and this depends on the specifics of the context. 
Specifically, the responses of one goal variable to their own or other goal variables’ shocks 
vary in response time, direction, and magnitude. An increase or shock in one goal variable 
can result in an increase, decrease, or no reaction of another goal variable subsequently. And 
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for any pair of goals, the response of one goal variable to another goal variable’s shock can 
be unidirectional. For instance, the response of safety to the efficiency shock is negative, 
while efficiency does not significantly respond to the safety shock. Hence, the relationship 
between goals can be asymmetric. This is very important theoretically and practically. This 
suggests that the response of goals imply directional causality but not just association 
between goals.  This directionality further complicates the conditions any realistic theory 
must fulfill. The correlation structures of goals obviously matter in important ways. The 
comparison of attention allocation in three pairs of goals shows that the rules of attention 
shifting are not homogeneous. There are three possible rules of attention allocation for goals 
with different correlation structures. The first is a parsimonious model in which each goal has 
a separate and independent effect on each other, and thus managerial actions. The second is 
the modified sequential attention rule, in which goals are conflicting with each other and high 
performance on one goal shifts discretionary attention toward to the next, making 
organizations pursue one primary goal at a time. The third is the goal activation rule, in 
which goals are positively coupled with each other and low performance on one goal 
reinforces the effect of low performance on another, making organizations pursue one goal 
more vigorously when another is not met. Organizations may use different attention shifting 
rules for different sets of goals, or for the same set of goals but with different attainment 
discrepancies of goal variables. This further suggests that attention allocation to goals 
depends on their own attainment discrepancies interacting with the attention allocation 
pattern which in turn is determined by the focal goal variable’s correlation structures with 
other goal variables. Therefore, the effects of goal variables’ attainment discrepancies on 
their growth are heterogeneous. This finding is important and supports that the relationship 
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between organizational goals may have several important consequences for problem solving 
and search (Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2009).  
Also, this study finds that individual auto models show strong heterogeneity in 
allocating discretionary attention to the same set of goals, which further supports the 
argument that attention allocation is context dependent (Ocasio, 1997). The order in which 
goals are attended is not uniform across organizations but depends on the preferences of the 
“dominant coalition” of each organization (Cyert & March, 1963).   This raises the 
possibility that context dependency may overwhelm the effect of general theoretical rules for 
shifting attention among goals in complex goal structures. Moreover, this study tests the 
“situation constrained” characteristic of attention suggested by the Carnegie School 
perspective, by exploring how firm characteristics including size, age, and geography affect 
the mechanisms of attention allocation. In sum, this study takes the first attempt to integrate 
into the theory of attention allocation to multiple goals some aspect(s) from other theoretical 
views such as the managerial choice of importance or goal priority from Ansoff’s (1979) 
view. It also suggests the conditions, relationships, and dynamics that new theories of 
attention allocation to goals must be able to explain. When the new theory arrives, it can still 
be based in bounded rationality and sequential attention, but it will move on to other concepts 
(perhaps still based on bounded rationality).  
Thirdly, the behavioral theory of the firm, as originally developed by Cyert and 
March (1963), is by far the most influential perspective in examining the allocation of 
attention in organizations (Augier & Prietula, 2007). However, as shown in Table 1 in the 
literature review section, there is only one empirical study (i.e., Greve, 2008) relying on 
BTOF and the same study is the only one that focuses on the attentional selection. More 
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work built on the tradition of BTOF is needed, starting with work that more fully exploit 
important insights in the original work. For example, this study brings back the research 
focus on some significant missing pillars of the Carnegie School. By revisiting the Carnegie 
School, Gavetti, Levinthal, and Ocasio (2007) conclude that the role and the importance of 
specialized decision making structures, and conflicting interests and cooperation inherent in 
organizational activity, have been significantly lost. This study reemphasizes the coexistence 
of multiple divergent goals within organizations and revitalizes the role of decision making, 
attention allocation, and goal conflict. 
Moreover, this study also contributes to the literature on adaptive aspirations. Prior 
research has suggested that organizational decision makers construct aspiration levels from 
organizational reference groups using multiple criteria (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1995; Porac 
& Thomas, 1990; Reger & Huff, 1993) and that market participation is particularly important 
for choosing reference groups (Clark & Montgomery, 1999). However, most studies on 
social aspiration levels have typically measured it as the mean or median performance of the 
industry, which implies that all organizations in the reference group are equally influential on 
a focal organization. A few exceptions (e.g., Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 2008) show that 
aspiration levels weighting firms by similarity gave stronger findings than those using the 
unweighted mean. This study relies on fine-grained measures of social aspirations by 
comparing each auto model with other participants in the same niche market (e.g., small cars 
and upscale sedans). Specifically, I constructed the social aspiration level of each auto model 
by using the average performance of all participants in the same niche market. I also ran the 
robustness check by constructing an alternative measure of social aspiration levels to test the 
upward striving mechanism (Cyert & March, 1963; Bromiley, 1991): players whose 
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performance are below the average of the niche market use the average performance as their 
social aspiration points, while players whose performance is above the average uses the 75th 
percentile of performance of the niche market as their social aspiration points. In so doing, 
this study strictly follows the rule of market participation as a particularly important 
consideration in choosing reference groups (Clark & Montgomery, 1999; Porac & Thomas, 
1990). 
7.1.3   Methodology contribution 
This research has methodological implications. To estimate the relationship among 
three goals (car fuel efficiency, safety, and reliability) that are determined endogenously 
across time, I rely on the panel vector autoregression model, combining the traditional VAR 
approach which captures co-evolution and interdependencies between multiple time series 
and treats all the variables in the system as endogenous, with the panel data approach which 
corrects for unobserved individual heterogeneity. I also rely on impulse-response functions to 
show the response of one variable of interest (e.g. safety) to a shock in another variable of 
interest (e.g. fuel efficiency), while holding other shocks constant. IRFs graphs visually 
represent the behavior of the variable series in response to the various shocks and show the 
directional relationships instead of correlations between goal variables. This methodology is 
new to the strategy field, but is appropriately driven by the research questions in this study. I 
would expect this method to have wide implications in the strategy field because most issues 
in strategy involve interdependency among key variables across time (e.g., the relationship 
between organizational strategy and structure), and VAR is one of the most powerful tools to 
study this interdependency across time. 
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7.2   Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research 
Examination of attention allocation across multiple goals opens up new avenues for 
research. This study appears to be the first exploratory examination of attention allocation 
across more than two goals within organizations. When the number of goals exceeds two, it 
is often more realistic, but also less analytically tractable. As noted, this research also has 
limitations that future research can address. First, the research is exploratory since empirical 
studies involving more than two goals have not previously been conducted, and lack a 
theoretical basis regarding sequential choice.  This exploration is driven by propositions 
based in what seem to be reasonable modifications and extensions of current theory. It 
develops and tests a model of how organizations selectively regulate the allocation of 
attention among multiple goals using the panel data from the US automotive industry. It 
raises the interesting questions such as how to differentiate discretionary attention from 
nondiscretionary attention, how goal interdependencies affect the attention allocation rules, 
and how effective are different possible attention allocation rules under varying contexts. The 
details of these results provide important insights and suggest the necessity of a substantial 
extension and modification of the theory of attention allocation. At this point the outlines of a 
new theory for more than two goals are still vague regarding the static allocations of attention 
across multiple goals under various conditions and the detailed dynamics regarding what 
drives reallocation and the resulting new allocation of attention given various drivers of 
change. Accordingly, more theoretical development and empirical examination of attention 
allocation among goals in different contexts is needed to help facilitate a revised theory of 
attention allocation to goals. 
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Second, in support of the argument that attention allocation is context dependent 
(Ocasio, 1997), the current study examines some possible moderators of attention allocation 
including organizational size, age, and geography. While the test results have interesting 
implications, more potential moderators are worth further exploration. Scholars have 
suggested firms’ patterns of resource allocation may be related to their strategies (Bower, 
1986). Vissa, Greve, Chen (2010) found organizational form and governance as moderators 
of organizational attention allocation. Conversely, more fine-grained analyses on 
organizational strategies (e.g., generalists versus specialists), organizational characteristics, 
or contingency factors are called to examine the effectiveness of different attention allocation 
rules. Moreover, studying what sequences of attention shifting rules are related to 
organizational success could be a productive area for future studies.  
Third, the results from the PVAR model and IRFs demonstrate the existence of 
directional causality among goals (asymmetry in their relationships). This further implies that 
goals are prioritized within organizations. Future study could also integrate goal priority into 
attention allocation research and examine the role of goal priority in attention allocation and 
the possible interaction effect of goal priority and goal correlation structures on attention 
shifts. 
A fourth limitation relates to the data used in the study. The empirical context in this 
study is the automotive industry. It is an appropriate setting for the current study. However, it 
is only a single industry. Future studies could generalize the results by examining how 
multiple goals interplay with each other over time in other industries.  Specifically, similar to 
Lant, Milliken, and Batra's (1992) examination on psychological and contextual factors of 
aspiration adaptation, future study could investigate how heterogeneous industries with 
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varying levels of turbulence differ in attention allocation patterns. Moreover, I used change 
of performance as the indicator of risk taking with the assumption that inconsistency or 
variation of outcomes is driven by the organizational risk-taking behavior. This is not the 
perfect measure but a reasonable first cut surrogate. I plan to further explore this issue in the 
future. Future studies, including my own, may explore how the attainment discrepancy of 
each performance dimension affects organizations’ introduction of new features or new 
product in that area by examining auto models’ technology specification data over years (e.g., 
the introduction of antilock technology as a result of attention allocation to the safety 
dimension).  
Overall, there remain considerable untapped opportunities to study the richness 
inherent in multiple goals and attention allocation building off the theoretical components 
and relationship structures originally developed by the Carnegie School (Gavetti, Levinthal, 
& Ocasio, 2007). This also calls for a serious consideration of how various types of decision 
making structures affect the intelligence of search and decision making (Ethiraj & Levinthal, 
2004; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003). Simon's (1947, 1962) insights on the hierarchical 
structure of organizational decision making provides a starting point for renewed attention to 
the consequences of structure on organizational decision making. Padgett's (1980a; 1980b; 
1981) work on the effects of hierarchy, ecological control, and serial judgment on federal 
budgetary decision-making processes is an early example of this research agenda. More 
recent simulation research on the effects of alternative decision structures is also relevant to 
this effort (e.g. Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003). Future research could 
follow this line of inquiry by empirically or theoretically examining how organizational 
design, posited as a mechanism parallel with sequential allocation of attention to enhance 
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organizational intelligence by the Carnegie School, could attenuate conflicts amongst 
competing goals and ease the attention allocation processes.  
7.3   Conclusion 
Attention allocation among multiple goals is a specific topic drawn from the Carnegie 
School perspective including Simon (1947), March and Simon (1958), and Cyert and March 
(1963). It is an old yet under-investigated idea, and it yields promising findings in a 
longitudinal study of three goals of automotive firms. The present study suggests that a 
complete theory of attention allocation for more than two goals might include the 
components of discretionary versus non-discretionary attention within organizations, impact 
of interdependencies or correlation structures of goals, and heterogeneity of organizations. 
The present study also suggests several opportunities for additional research. For instance, 
more empirical work examining attention allocation among goals in different contexts is 
needed to help facilitate a revised theory of attention allocation to goals; more fine-grained 
analyses on organizational strategies, organizational characteristics, or contingency factors 
are called to examine the effectiveness of different attention allocation rules; future study 
could also examine the role of goal priority in attention allocation and the possible interaction 
effect of goal priority and goal correlation structures on attention shifts. Despite the progress 
made here and in other recent research on multiple goals (Audia & Brion, 2007; Baum et al., 
2005; Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2009; Greve, 2008; McNamara, Moon, & Bromiley, 2002), 
organizational responses to goals still define a research area where important questions 
remain unexplored. 
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Table 1 Selected Studies on Attention 
Study Meta-theory Attention 
to attention 
Attention 
measure 
Dependent 
variable 
Findings 
Thornton and 
Ocasio (1999) 
Institutional 
theory; ABV 
 
Perspective Interviews, 
inferred 
CEO 
succession 
Institutional logics 
moderate attention to 
market and 
organizational factors. 
 
Hung (2005) ABV; 
institutional 
theory 
 
Perspective Comparative 
case 
analysis 
Entry into 
China 
 
Focus on regulatory 
versus market 
environment shaped by 
external ties. 
 
Cho and 
Hambrick 
(2006) 
ABV;TMT 
 
Perspective Content 
analysis of 
letters to 
shareholders 
 
Attention to 
orientation; 
strategic 
change 
Attention mediates 
TMT effects on 
adaptation. 
Bouquet et al. 
(2009) 
 
ABV 
 
Perspective Survey 
 
Financial 
performance 
 
Curvilinear effects of 
global attention on 
performance. 
 
Tuggle, Sirmon, 
Reutzel, and 
Bierman (2010) 
ABV Perspective Content 
analysis of 
board 
meeting 
transcripts 
 
Attention to 
monitoring 
Deviation from prior 
performance and CEO 
duality affect BOD’ 
attention to monitoring. 
Eggers and 
Kaplan (2009)  
Managerial 
cognition 
 
Perspective Content 
analysis of 
letters to 
shareholders 
 
Technology 
commercializa
tion 
 
CEO attention to 
technology increases 
commercialization. 
 
Kaplan (2008) 
 
Managerial 
cognition 
 
Perspective Content 
analysis of 
letters to 
shareholders 
 
Patent activity 
 
CEO attention to 
technology increases 
patenting. 
 
Nadkarni and 
Barr (2008) 
 
Managerial 
cognition 
 
Perspective Causal maps 
of 
letters to 
shareholders 
 
Environmental 
attention; 
speed 
of strategic 
change 
 
Attention to task 
environment  mediates 
the effects of  industry 
velocity. 
Kabanoff and 
Brown (2008)  
Managerial 
cognition 
 
Perspective 
 
Content 
analysis of 
letters to 
shareholders 
Financial 
performance 
 
Attentional 
configurations 
create performance 
differences. 
 
Ocasio and 
Joseph (2008) 
 
ABV 
 
Engagement 
 
Documents; 
secondary 
sources 
 
Change in 
strategic 
planning 
 
Developing and 
coupling of attentional 
channels shapes 
strategic planning. 
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Study Meta-theory Attention 
to attention 
Attention 
measure 
Dependent 
variable 
Findings 
Rerup (2009) 
 
ABV; 
sensemaking 
 
Engagement 
 
Case analysis 
of rare event 
 
Attention to 
issues 
 
Learning from rare 
events involves 
attentional vividness, 
stability, coherence. 
 
Nigam and 
Ocasio (2010) 
 
Sensemaking; 
ABV 
 
Engagement 
 
Content 
analysis of 
industry 
journal 
 
Enactment of 
environment 
 
Attention to event 
triggers top-down and 
bottom-up 
sensemaking. 
 
Hansen and 
Hass ( 2001)  
Ecology; 
ABV 
 
Selection 
(bottom-up) 
 
Number of 
document 
hits 
 
Attention to 
documents 
 
Focus increases 
attention in crowded 
markets. 
 
Hoffman and 
Ocasio (2001) 
 
ABV; 
identity 
theory 
 
Selection 
(top-down) 
 
Content 
analysis of 
industry 
journal 
 
Attention to 
events 
 
Media attention is 
shaped by industry 
identity and 
accountability. 
 
Bouquet and 
Birkinshaw 
(2008) 
 
ABV; issue 
selling 
 
Selection 
(top-down; 
 bottom-up) 
Survey 
 
Relative 
attention to 
subsidiary 
 
Attention to 
multinational 
subsidiaries is a 
function of weight and 
voice.  
 
Greve (2008) 
 
BTOF 
 
Selection 
 
Inferred from 
shifts in 
aspiration 
levels 
Firm growth 
 
Attention to aspiration 
levels for size and 
performance. 
Note: This table is adapted from Ocasio (2011); Theoretical approach: ABV, attention-based view; BTOF, 
behavioral theory of the firm; TMT, top management team; BOD, board of directors. 
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Table 2 Selected Studies on Aspirations (Built on Behaviorial Theory and Adaptive Learning) 
 
Study 
 
 
Aspiration 
measure 
Other 
independent 
variables 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Context 
 
Findings 
Simon (1955) 
 
HA 
 
Simple payoffs, 
Costly 
information 
 
Rational 
choice 
 
Book  Aspirations adjust to 
previous aspiration 
level and attainment. 
March and 
Simon 
(1958) 
 
   Book  Bounded rationality, 
Satisficing. 
Cyert and 
March 
(1963) 
 
   Book  Credited with 
“Aspirations Theory”. 
 
Simon (1964) 
 
    Organizational goals 
help determine 
courses of action. 
 
Greve 
(2003c) 
 
   Book Learning and change 
from performance 
feedback. 
 
Levinthal and 
March (1981)  
HA 
 
Slack, 
Experience, 
Technology 
 
Performance 
 
Simulation 
 
Sharp distinctions 
between success and 
failure. 
 
March and 
Shapira 
(1987) 
 
Aspiration 
 
Performance, 
Survival point 
 
Risk taking 
 
Simulation  Aspiration and 
survival points; Ideas 
about attention. 
 
March (1988) 
 
SA 
 
Wealth 
(performance) 
 
Risk 
 
Simulation 
 
Adaptive aspirations 
and variable risk 
preferences. 
 
Lant and 
Mezias 
(1992)  
WAE 
 
Environment, 
Ambiguity, 
Size, 
Search rules 
 
Change 
 
Simulation 
 
Aspirations mediate 
failure/success 
Interpretation; 
Learning model 
approximates 
punctuated equilibria. 
 
March and 
Shapira 
(1992)  
HA + SA 
 
Aspiration 
adjustment 
Rate, 
Shifting attention 
 
Variable risk 
Taking, 
Survival 
 
Simulation 
 
Historical aspirations 
different than social in 
learning rate influence 
on risk taking; 
Survival reference 
point is salient. 
 
Mezias and 
Glynn (1993)  
WAE 
 
Institution, 
revolution, 
and evolution 
strategies 
Innovation 
performance 
 
Simulation 
 
Performance 
aspirations mediate 
search–change 
relationship. 
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Study 
 
 
Aspiration 
measure 
Other 
independent 
variables 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Context 
 
Findings 
 Denrell and 
March (2001)  
WAE 
 
Learning rate 
 
Risk taking 
 
Simulation 
 
Slow adaptation 
increases risk taking. 
 
Knudsen 
(2008) 
 
SA 
 
Wealth 
(performance) 
 
Risk 
preferences 
 
Simulation 
 
Social comparison 
aids wealth and 
survival. 
 
Hu, Blettner, 
and Bettis 
(2011) 
HA + SA Adapting speed, 
reference group 
setting strategy 
Risk 
preferences, 
Wealth 
 
Simulation 
 
The effectiveness of 
adapting speeds and 
reference group 
setting strategies 
depends on the risk 
preference functions. 
 
Lant and 
Montgomery 
(1987) 
 
HA, 
Performance 
 
 R&D, 
Resources 
 
Aspirations, 
Risk, 
Search 
 
Executive 
education 
marketing 
strategy 
simulation 
 
Aspiration equation 
supported; Risk taking 
is related to past risk 
taking; 
Negative attainment 
discrepancy is related 
to innovativeness. 
 
Lant (1992) 
 
WAE 
 
Past aspiration, 
Performance, 
AD 
 
Aspiration 
levels 
 
Executive 
education 
marketing 
strategy 
simulation 
 
Best fit was to an AD 
model (adaptive 
history dependent 
model) 
 
Lant and 
Hewlin 
(2002) 
 
 
HSA 
 
Decision 
momentum, 
 Competitor 
actions, 
Decision 
processes 
 
Tactical and 
strategic 
decision 
making 
 
Strategy 
simulation 
game 
 
Past performance did 
not influence tactical 
decisions. 
 
Greve (2002)  HSA 
 
Aspiration 
updating 
 
Strategy 
change 
 
Simulation of 
strategy 
change, 
Radio industry 
 
Slower aspiration 
adjustment results in 
higher performance. 
 
Denrell 
(2008)  
Performance 
 
 Risk taking 
 
Simulation 
and 
COMPUSTAT 
 
Alternative model: 
avoid actions with 
poor past performance 
= variable risk 
preferences. 
 
Manns and 
March (1978)  
Performance 
 
Reputation 
 
Curriculum 
change 
 
University 
curriculum 
 
Reputation, not only 
financial condition, 
influenced change. 
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Study 
 
 
Aspiration 
measure 
Other 
independent 
variables 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Context 
 
Findings 
Singh (1986) 
 
Performance 
 
Performance 
aspiration, 
Slack, 
Decentralization 
 
Risk taking 
 
 
U.S. and 
Canadian 
firms 
 
Poor performance 
relative to competitors 
increases risk taking. 
 
Grinyer and 
McKiernan 
(1990)  
HA+SA 
 
SA, 
HA, 
External 
expectations 
 
Major change 
 
U.K. firms 
that 
“sharpbent” 
performance 
 
Aspiration-induced 
crisis required for 
radical change; 
Various sources and 
types of aspirations. 
 
Bromiley 
(1991) 
 
SAae, 
Above +5% 
 
Performance, 
Expectations, 
Slack 
 
Risk taking 
 
U.S. firms in 
COMPUSTAT 
 
Low performance and 
lack of slack drive risk 
taking. 
 
Lant, 
Milliken, 
and Batra 
(1992) 
 
SA 
 
CEO turnover, 
TMT attributes, 
Environmental 
awareness, 
External 
attributions 
 
Strategic 
reorientation 
 
Furniture and 
computer 
software 
industries 
 
Past performance, 
managerial 
interpretations, 
industry context, and 
TMT characteristics 
influence strategic 
reorientation. 
 
Bolton (1993) 
 
SA 
 
R&D, 
Slack 
 
Innovation 
 
High 
technology 
firms in 
United States 
 
Propensity to innovate 
fluctuates with 
performance when 
timing is controlled. 
 
Gooding et 
al. (1996)  
SA— 
inflection 
point 
 
Industry, 
Time 
 
Inflection 
point of risk 
 
U.S. firms in 
COMPUSTAT 
 
Reference point is 
elevated above 
industry median; 
Aspirations influenced 
by industry conditions 
and economy. 
 
Miller and 
Leiblein 
(1996) 
 
 
SEL—HA 
 
Downside risk, 
Slack 
 
Financial 
performance 
 
U.S. firms in 
COMPUSTAT 
 
 
Downside risk leads to 
strategic changes that 
improve performance; 
Slack moderates. 
 
Wiseman and 
Bromiley 
(1996) 
 
 
SAae, 
Above +5% 
 
Expectations, 
Slack, 
Size 
 
Risk, 
Performance, 
Size change 
 
U.S. firms in 
COMPUSTAT 
and IBES 
 
Extends Bromiley 
(1991) with single 
measure of attainment 
discrepancy. 
 
McNamara 
and Bromiley 
(1997)  
Past 
performance 
 
Relationship 
duration, 
Loan amount, 
Industry 
attributes, 
Standardization 
 
Risk-rating 
errors 
 
Five branches 
of Norwest 
Banks 
 
Performance did not 
influence risk rating 
errors. 
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Study 
 
 
Aspiration 
measure 
Other 
independent 
variables 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Context 
 
Findings 
Wiseman and 
Catanach 
(1997)  
SA 
 
Slack, leverage, 
stock ownership, 
Regulation, 
Rivalry 
 
Risk, 
Performance 
 
U.S. savings 
and loan banks 
 
Regulated and 
deregulated context 
has influence; 
Behavioral and 
agency theories both 
have influences. 
 
Greve (1998)  HSA 
 
SA, 
HA 
 
Production 
and format 
change 
 
Radio 
Broadcasting 
in United 
States 
 
Aspiration-level 
learning has 
behavioral 
consequences; Kinked 
curve relationship. 
 
Ketchen and 
Palmer 
(1999)  
SA 
 
Referent group, 
SA 
(years of poor 
performance) 
 
Change in the 
profile of 
technologies 
and services 
 
Metropolitan 
hospitals 
 
Partial support for 
behavioral—poor 
performance leads to 
change; Method to 
determine strategic 
group referent. 
 
Palmer and 
Wiseman 
(1999) 
 
 
SAae, 
Above +5% 
 
Dynamism, 
Ownership, 
TMT, 
Slack, 
Prior risk taking, 
 
Managerial 
risk taking, 
Organization 
risk taking 
 
U.S. firms in 
COMPUSTAT 
 
AD relates to both 
managerial and 
organizational risk 
taking. 
 
Audia, Locke, 
and Smith 
(2000) 
 
Past 
performance 
Satisfaction 
 
Market diversity, 
Size, 
CEO change 
 
Strategic 
Persistence, 
Performance 
 
Airlines, 
trucking, and 
a simulation 
 
Success leads to 
dysfunctional 
persistence in strategy. 
 
Deephouse 
and Wiseman 
(2000)  
SAae, 
Above +5% 
 
Slack, 
Leverage, 
BOD monitoring 
 
Risk, 
Return 
 
U.S. firms in 
COMPUSTAT 
and IBES 
 
Turbulent and growth 
period is different; 
Growth period risk 
was lower for high-
performing firms. 
 
Mezias et 
al.(2002)  
HSA 
 
Previous 
aspiration 
 
Current 
aspiration 
 
Financial 
services retail 
in United 
States 
 
Direct measure of 
aspiration; Previous 
aspiration is most 
important. 
 
Chatterjee, 
Wiseman, 
Fiegenbaum, 
and Devers 
(2003) 
  
HA+SA 
 
Industry growth 
prospects, 
Executive 
compensation 
 
Risk, 
Earnings 
 
 Risk taking is 
important to 
competitive 
advantage. 
Greve 
(2003a)  
WAE 
 
Slack 
 
R&D 
intensity, 
Innovation 
launches 
 
Shipbuilding 
in Japan 
 
Attainment functions 
as a “master switch” 
to many 
organizational 
behaviors. 
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Study 
 
 
Aspiration 
measure 
Other 
independent 
variables 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Context 
 
Findings 
Greve 
(2003b)  
HSA 
 
Slack 
 
Assets, 
Installed 
machinery 
 
Shipbuilding 
in Japan 
 
Solutions compared 
based on risk 
tolerance. 
 
Short and 
Palmer 
(2003) 
 
 
HSA 
 
Size, 
Performance, 
Age 
 
Referents— 
external or 
internal 
 
Restaurant 
industry in 
United States 
 
Support for strategic 
reference point theory; 
Firms have unique 
referents. 
 
Miller and 
Chen (2004)  
HA+SA 
 
Bankruptcy risk 
 
Risk taking 
 
U.S. 
manufacturing 
firms 
 
Risk taking increases 
as performance 
decreases for firms 
above aspirations, 
below aspirations, and 
near bankruptcy. 
 
 Baum et al. 
(2005)  
HSA 
 
Market share and 
network status 
 
Partnering 
behavior 
 
 Investment 
banks in 
Canada 
 
Aspiration-learning 
models apply to 
investment banks 
partnering risk. 
 
Massini, 
Lewin, and 
Greve (2005) 
 
SA 
 
Referent groups 
high, medium, 
low 
 
Adoption of 
innovative 
forms 
 
INNFORM 
Euro and U.S. 
firms 
 
Referent groups are 
different by level of 
innovation. 
 
Audia and 
Greve (2006) 
 
HA+SA 
 
Firm size 
 
Factory 
expansion 
 
Shipbuilding 
in Japan 
 
Risk aversion 
hypothesis supported. 
 
Audia and 
Brion (2007) 
 
SEL-HA 
 
Revenue growth, 
Profitability 
growth 
 
Product 
introductions 
 
University 
undergrads, 
Hard disk 
drive firms 
 
Decision makers are 
self-enhance; 
Contradicts behavioral 
theory. 
 
Baum and 
Dahlin (2007) 
 
HSA 
 
Others 
experience 
Own experience 
 
Experience 
vs. vicarious 
learning 
 
U.S. freight 
railroads 
 
Aspirations affect 
experiential versus 
vicarious learning; 
Experience moderates 
 
Chen and 
Miller (2007) 
 
HA+SA 
 
Bankruptcy, 
Slack 
 
R&D search 
intensity 
 
U.S. 
manufacturing 
firms 
 
R&D is related to 
focus on bankruptcy, 
performance below 
aspirations, 
performance above 
aspirations, and slack. 
 
Harris and 
Bromiley 
(2007)  
HSA 
 
Incentive 
compensation 
 
Misconduct: 
financial 
statements 
 
U.S. firms that 
Restated 
income 
because of 
irregularities 
 
Incentive 
compensation and 
performance 
aspirations influence 
financial statement 
misrepresentation (at 
extremes). 
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Study 
 
 
Aspiration 
measure 
Other 
independent 
variables 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Context 
 
Findings 
Park (2007)  WAE, 
Above +5% 
 
Target-focal firm 
relative 
performance 
 
Strategic 
positioning 
 
U.S. food 
processing 
industry 
 
Direction of strategic 
change is shaped by 
aspiration, 
performance, and gap 
to referent firm. 
 
Shimizu 
(2007)  
Performance 
of acquired 
unit 
 
Ambiguity, 
Failure to 
improve, 
Resource 
availability, 
Divestiture 
experience, 
Relative size 
 
Divestiture 
decisions 
 
Mergers of 
U.S. firms 
(1988–1998) 
 
Effect of performance 
nonlinear; Moderators 
of the aspiration– 
divestiture 
relationship 
(ambiguity, 
performance, 
resource, experience, 
and size). 
 
Desai (2008)  SEL-SA 
 
Operating 
experience, 
Legitimacy, 
Age 
 
Capacity and 
asset growth 
 
U.S. railroad 
firms 
 
Operating experience 
and legitimacy 
moderate. 
 
Greve (2008) 
 
SA 
 
Size aspirations, 
Performance 
aspirations. 
 
Growth 
 
Insurance 
industry in 
Norway 
 
Organizations seek to 
meet aspirations on 
multiple goals; 
Aspiration for size is 
attended before 
growth. 
 
Iyer and 
Miller (2008) 
 
HA+SA 
 
Distance from 
Bankruptcy, 
Slack 
 
Corporate 
acquisitions 
 
U.S. 
manufacturing 
firms  
(1980– 2000) 
 
Survival, aspirations, 
and slack; Acquisition 
probability increases 
as performance 
increases for firms 
below aspiration. 
 
Lant and 
Shapira 
(2008)  
 Semantic 
differences in 
terminology 
 
Managerial 
mode of 
reasoning 
 
Israeli 
economists 
and managers 
 
Separates how 
managers think about 
aspirations and 
expectations. 
 
Labianca, 
Fairbank, 
Andrevski, 
and Parzen 
(2009) 
 
SA 
 
Competitive and 
striving 
discrepancy 
 
Planned 
change 
 
Business 
schools 
 
Striving discrepancies 
relate to radical 
change. 
Mishina et al. 
(2010) 
 
 
SA 
 
Stock price 
relative to 
expectations, 
Prominence 
 
 
 
Corporate 
illegality 
 
S&P 500 firms 
(1990–1999) 
 
Performance above 
aspirations increases 
illegality particularly 
for prominent firms. 
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Study 
 
 
Aspiration 
measure 
Other 
independent 
variables 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Context 
 
Findings 
Vissa, Greve, 
and Chen 
(2010) 
 
WAE 
 
Business group 
affiliation 
 
Market and 
R&D search 
 
PROWESS— 
Indian firms 
 
Organizational form 
and governance are 
moderators. 
 
Blettner, He, 
Hu, and 
Bettis (2012) 
Internal and 
external SA 
Previous 
aspirations,  
Age, Size, 
Stages of life 
cycle, 
Advertising 
Strategy,  
Time, Firm 
Current 
aspiration 
level 
German 
magazine 
industry from 
(1972 – 2009) 
Cross-sectional and 
inter-temporal 
heterogeneity of 
aspiration updating for 
organizations. 
Multiple variables 
explain this variance. 
Note: This table is adapted from Shinkle (2012); Aspiration approach: HA = historical comparison 
(discrepancy); SA = social comparison (discrepancy); WAE = weighted equation combination; HSA = both HA 
and SA simultaneously modeled; SEL = both HA and SA independently modeled, then one selected; SAae = 
SA based on analysts’ expectations not performance; Above 5% = Bromiley’s (1991) adjustment for firms 
above aspirations. Theoretical approach: TMT = top management team; BOD = board of directors. 
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Table 3 Variable Description and Measure 
Variables Description Measure Main Data Source 
Safety 
Safety 
performance of 
each model 
Safety rating (1 to 5) is based on CR’s Safety Assessment. 
Each model is assigned with an overall safety score from 0 to 
100. The overall safety score is equally divided into 5 ranges: 
the lowest rating of 1 is assigned to a model with an overall 
score between 1 and 20, the highest rating of 5 is assigned to 
a model with an overall score between 80 and 100, and a 
model with a score in between is assigned with a rating of 2, 
3 or 4. The overall safety score equally combines the 
accident-avoidance and crash-protection ratings. Accident 
avoidance reflects CR’ test results for braking performance, 
emergency handling, acceleration, driving position, visibility, 
and set comfort. Crash protection is based on the most 
current crash tests (IIHS offset-crash results and either 
frontal- or side-crash results from NHTSA). 
Consumer 
Reports, IIHS, 
NHTSA 
Efficiency 
Fuel efficiency 
performance of 
each model 
Fuel efficiency rating (1 to 5) is based on CR’s annual car 
road test, and the efficiency information published by EPA. 
The overall mileage per gallon (mpg) of each model was 
used, with mpg below 15 as 1, mpg between 16 and 20 as 2, 
mpg between 21 and 25 as 3, mpg between 26 and 30 as 4, 
and mpg above 30 as 5. 
Consumer 
Reports, EPA 
Reliability 
Reliability 
performance of 
each model 
Reliability rating (1 to 5) is based on each model’s frequency 
of repair record and problem rate from CR’s annual customer 
surveys. By comparing with the similar models in the 
market, each vehicle model is rated from 1 to 5 with 
approximately equal intervals and 5 as the best rating. For 
instance, a problem rate not far from the average gets the 
average rating of 3, to earn a rating of 2 or 4, a model’s 
problem rate differs by 2.5 percentage points. To earn a 
rating of 1 or 5, a model’s problem rate differs by at least 5 
percentage points. 
Consumer 
Reports 
Z_safety Standardized value of safety 
It is calculated as dividing the difference of an individual 
safety rating and the industry average safety rating by the 
population standard deviation for a specific year. 
 
Z_efficiency 
Standardized 
value of 
efficiency 
It is calculated as dividing the difference of an individual 
fuel efficiency rating and the industry fuel efficiency rating 
by the population standard deviation for a specific year. 
 
Z_reliability 
Standardized 
value of 
reliability 
It is calculated as dividing the difference of an individual 
reliability rating and the industry average reliability rating by 
the population standard deviation for a specific year. 
 
Aspiration 
level 
Social 
aspiration level  
Calculated as the average of the ratings of the goal variables 
of all similar vehicles in the same vehicle category  
S_discrepancy  
Attainment 
discrepancy of 
safety  
Calculated as the difference between performance of the 
safety goal variable and social aspiration level of safety  
E_discrepancy 
Attainment 
discrepancy of 
efficiency 
Calculated as the difference between performance of the 
efficiency goal variable and social aspiration level of 
efficiency 
 
R_discrepancy 
Attainment 
discrepancy of 
reliability 
Calculated as the difference between performance of the 
reliability goal variable and social aspiration level of 
reliability 
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Variables Description Measure Main Data Source 
Sale Units sold of each model 
 
The sold  units of each auto model  
Automotive 
News 
Model Size Revenue size of each model Logarithm of one plus revenues 
Automotive 
News 
Age Age of each model Logarithm of one plus age 
Automotive 
magazines, 
company 
websites 
Price Model price Logarithm of one plus manufacturer’s suggested retail price Consumer Reports 
Nameplate 
Size 
Revenue size 
of each 
nameplate 
Logarithms of one plus total revenues within the nameplate 
 
Product line 
number 
Count of 
product Lines 
The number of the product produced within a nameplate at a 
specific year 
 
Niche count 
Number of 
niches for 
nameplates 
Number of categories in which a nameplate offers products  
 
Diversification 
Nameplate 
level of 
diversification 
One minus a Herfindahl index of its distribution of own 
premiums across the niches 
 
MMC 
Average of 
Multimarket 
contact number 
This measure is formed by taking, for each multimarket 
competitor (each Make a focal Make meets in at least two 
niche markets), the proportion of focal Make markets in 
which the competitors is also present. This proportion was 
averaged over all multimarket competitors to yield the 
average multimarket contact of the focal Make 
 
Financial 
performance 
Company-level 
financial 
performance 
The ratio of operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) 
to total assets (AT). COMPUSTAT 
Industry size 
Industry 
investment 
opportunities 
Logarithm of one plus sum of all auto models’ revenues  
Dummy 
variables  
Year, model, 
nameplate, 
company, 
geography  
Dummy variables for year, model, nameplate, company and 
geography (domestic vs. international)  
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          Table 4 Descriptive Statisticsa and Correlationsb between Key Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Safety 1764 3.67 .99 1 5 4 1.00 
2. Efficiency 1950 2.32 1.18 1 5 2 .05 1.00 
3. Reliability 2104 3.11 1.33 1 5 3 .04 .32 1.00 
4. Z_safetyc 1764 .02 .99 -2.75 2.14 .22 .94 .11 .06 1.00 
5. Z_efficiency 1950 -.04 .96 -2.47 2.96 -.17 .12 .88 .36 .10 1.00 
6. Z_reliability 2104 .03 1.00 -1.99 1.74 -.06 .04 .35 .99 .07 .36 1.00 
7. S_discrepancyd 1764 .05 .83 -2.7 2.73 .05 .83 .12 .07 .83 .12 .07 1.00 
8. E_discrepancy 1950 -.02 .62 -2.65 2.67 -.05 .04 .51 .27 .04 .58 .28 .08 1.00 
9. R_discrepancy 2104 .06 1.21 -2.91 2.93 0 .02 .20 .91 .04 .19 .91 .06 .29 1.00 
10. Size 2550 7.02 1.18 .12 10.37 6.77 .09 -.22 -.09 .03 -.16 -.10 .08 -.01 -.06 1.00 
11. Age 2583 2.73 .74 .69 4.33 2.77 .11 -.11 -.15 .06 -.01 -.15 .01 -.09 -.13 .15 
12. Price 2566 9.87 .94 8.50 11.58 9.95 .15 -.62 -.05 .06 -.34 -.08 -.03 -.10 -.04 .41 
13. Nameplate size 2583 9.13 1.11 4.92 11.29 9.11 .05 -.20 -.13 -.03 -.07 -.13 .04 .06 -.05 .49 
14. Product umber 2583 9.41 4.52 1 21 8 -.02 -.09 -.06 -.07 .01 -.06 -.01 .09 .01 .25 
15. Niche count 2583 5.56 2.43 1 13 5 .04 -.05 .11 -.02 .09 .11 .00 .14 .15 .23 
16. MMC 2583 .59 .20 0 1 .58 .00 .18 .01 .04 .07 .02 -.01 -.05 -.02 -.16 
17. Diversification 2583 .77 .12 0 .91 .80 -.03 -.01 -.11 -.05 .03 -.10 -.03 .07 -.04 .18 
18. ROA 2506 .09 .05 -.12 .31 .09 .07 .19 -.02 .13 .00 .02 .13 .02 .04 .06 
19. Industry size 2583 12.45 .53 10.87 13.11 12.61 .14 -.39 .01 -.03 .02 -.03 -.05 .01 -.02 .23 
                                a The data have 2583 observations. 
                                b Coefficients greater in magnitude than .05 are significant at the .05 level. 
                     c Z_safety,  Z_efficiency, Z_reliability are the Z scores (standard scores) of safety, efficiency, and reliability. 
                      d S_discrepancy, E_disrepancy, R_discrepancy are the attainment discrepancy of safety, efficiency and reliability 
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         Continued - Table 4 Descriptive Statisticsa and Correlationsb between Key Variables 
    
Variable 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
11. Age 1.00 
12. Price .15 1.00 
13. Nameplate size .22 .09 1.00 
14. Product number .14 .00 .80 1.00 
15. Niche count .12 .05 .70 .84 1.00 
16. MMC -.06 -.07 -.34 -.35 -.42 1.00 
17. Diversification .12 -.08 .64 .74 .65 -.09 1.00 
18. ROA -.05 -.16 .03 -.11 -.18 .12 -.05 1.00 
19. Industry size .19 .44 .36 .23 .30 -.19 .09 -.30 1.00 
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Table 5 Main Results of the Panel VAR Model 
 
βt-1 
Safety Efficiency Reliability 
Safety .41*** -.34*** -.14** 
(11.74) (-2.91) (-2.28) 
Efficiency -.026 .22*** -.11*** 
(-1.22) (2.61) (-2.62) 
Reliability -.01 .16** .53*** 
(-.28) (2.01) (12.72) 
                                    Note: The model coefficients are estimated using GMM method in the PVAR model as  
                                        described in Holtz et al. (1988). The data are Helmert transformed prior to  
                                        estimation in order to remove the fixed effects. The original variables are time- 
                                        demeaned before Helmert transformation. The model uses untransformed variables  
                                        as instruments for the Helmert-transformed variables in the model. The values  
                                         within parentheses are t value from GMM test.  
                                      Obs. Number = 813 
                                         *      Significant at .1 level 
                                         **    Significant at .05 level  
                                         ***  Significant at .01 level  
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Table 6 OLS Regressions of Growth of Goal Variablesa 
 
Variable 
 
Model 1 
Efficiency 
Growth 
Model 2 
Safety 
Growth 
Model 3 
Reliability  
Growth 
1 Revenues   .01     (.02) .03*    (.02)  .00      (.02) 
2 Age -.03     (.03) .03      (.04) -.03      (.04) 
3 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelb -.06     (.09) 
4 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelc -.48***(.08) 
5 Safety - Aspiration Levelb -.40***(.11) 
6 Safety - Aspiration Levelc -.29***(.09) 
7 Reliability - Aspiration Levelb -.17*    (.09) 
8 Reliability - Aspiration Levelc -.23***(.07) 
9 Efficiency – Aspiration levelb
(indicator variable)  .04     (.08) -.42***(.10) 
10 Safety – Aspiration levelb
(indicator variable) -.16***(.06)  .06     (.10) 
11 Reliability – Aspiration levelb
(indicator variable) -.10*     (.06) -.08      (.08) 
12 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelb ×
Safety – Aspiration levelb -.17      (.10) 
13 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelc ×
Safety – Aspiration levelb   .21**  (.10) 
14 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelb ×
Reliability – Aspiration levelb -.05     (.11) 
15 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelc ×
Reliability – Aspiration levelb -.05     (.11) 
16 Safety - Aspiration Levelb ×
Efficiency – Aspiration levelb  .09      (.12) 
17 Safety - Aspiration Levelc ×
Efficiency – Aspiration levelb  .04      (.11) 
18 Safety - Aspiration Levelb ×
Reliability – Aspiration levelb -.07      (.12) 
19 Safety - Aspiration Levelc ×
Reliability – Aspiration levelb -.05     (.11) 
20 Reliability - Aspiration Levelb ×
Efficiency – Aspiration levelb -.19**  (.10) 
21 Reliability - Aspiration Levelc ×
Efficiency – Aspiration levelb   .22**  (.09) 
22 Reliability - Aspiration Levelb ×
Safety – Aspiration levelb  -.05     (.09) 
23 Reliability – Aspiration Levelc ×
Safety – Aspiration levelb   -.01     (.08) 
24 Constant .19     (.22) -.81**  (.29)    .23     (.31) 
25 Year Dummies Yes 
26 Model Dummies No 
27 Obs. 881 851 890 
28 Adj. R-squared .198 .215 .115 
                             a Standard errors are in parentheses.  
                             b If less than zero. 
                             c If more than zero. 
                             *** p<0.01         ** p<0.05       * p<0.1 
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Table 7 OLS Regressions of Growth of Goal Variables (Full Models)a 
 
Variable 
 
Model 1 
Efficiency 
Growth 
Model 2 
Safety 
Growth 
Model 3 
Reliability  
Growth 
1 Revenues  .02      (.02) .03      (.03) -.04     (.03) 
2 Age -.06      (.12) .38**  (.16)  .05     (.16) 
3 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelb -.30**  (.13) 
4 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelc -.71***(.10) 
5 Safety - Aspiration Levelb -.55***(.13) 
6 Safety - Aspiration Levelc -.40***(.10) 
7 Reliability - Aspiration Levelb -.60***(.09) 
8 Reliability - Aspiration Levelc -.62***(.08) 
9 Efficiency – Aspiration levelb
(indicator variable) .18*    (.10) -.21*    (.11) 
10 Safety – Aspiration levelb
(indicator variable) -.19**  (.06)  .16     (.10) 
11 Reliability – Aspiration levelb
(indicator variable)  .02      (.08) .06     (.09) 
12 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelb ×
Safety – Aspiration levelb -.44***(.14) 
13 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelc ×
Safety – Aspiration levelb .34***(.11) 
14 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelb ×
Reliability – Aspiration levelb .12     (.14) 
15 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelc ×
Reliability – Aspiration levelb -.09     (.13) 
16 Safety - Aspiration Levelb ×
Efficiency – Aspiration levelb .24*    (.13) 
17 Safety - Aspiration Levelc ×
Efficiency – Aspiration levelb  .02      (.13) 
18 Safety - Aspiration Levelb ×
Reliability – Aspiration levelb -.08     (.13) 
19 Safety - Aspiration Levelc ×
Reliability – Aspiration levelb -.04     (.13) 
20 Reliability - Aspiration Levelb ×
Efficiency – Aspiration levelb -.15     (.10) 
21 Reliability - Aspiration Levelc ×
Efficiency – Aspiration levelb .16*    (.09) 
22 Reliability - Aspiration Levelb ×
Safety – Aspiration levelb .07     (.10) 
23 Reliability – Aspiration Levelc ×
Safety – Aspiration levelb .00     (.09) 
24 Constant .01     (.35) -1.86** (.92) .31     (.55) 
25 Year Dummies Yes 
26 Model Dummies Yes 
27 Obs. 881 851 890 
28 Adj. R-squared .211 .233 .309 
                             a Standard errors are in parentheses.  
                             b If less than zero. 
                             c If more than zero. 
                             *** p<0.01         ** p<0.05       * p<0.1
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Table 8 Summary of Attention Shifting Rules for Different Pairs of Goals 
  
Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3 Pair 4 Pair 5 Pair 6 
 
Dependent 
variable  
 
Efficiency 
growth 
Efficiency 
growth 
Safety 
growth 
Safety 
growth 
Reliability 
growth 
Reliability 
growth 
 
Second 
goal 
 
 
Safety Reliability Efficiency Reliability Efficiency Safety 
 
 
Attention 
shifting 
rule 
 
 
P Activation  --- 
Modified 
sequential 
attention  
---  --- ---  
 
N 
Modified 
sequential 
attention  
--- ---  ---  
Modified 
sequential 
attention  
--- 
 
Note: “---” means no significant interaction between goals; “P” means when the focus goal has positive 
attainment discrepancy; “N” means when the focal goal has negative attainment discrepancy.  
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Table 9 Model Fixed-Effect Coefficients from OLS Regressionsa 
Model Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Base Auto Model 
OLS Model 1 152 .05 .32 -1.16 .78 Honda Odyssey 
OLS Model 2 152 -.03 .45 -1.46 1.77 Oldsmobile Bravada 
OLS Model 3 152 -.13 .72 -1.81 1.74 Hyundai Elantra 
             a The magnitude of auto model fixed-effect coefficients depends on the base model (the model dropped in      
           the regressions). The fixed-effect coefficients should be interpreted as the difference from the base model  
           in each regression model.   
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Table 10 OLS Regressions with the Alternative SA Measurea 
 
Variable 
 
Model 1 
Efficiency  
Growth 
Model 2 
Safety 
Growth 
Model 3 
Reliability  
Growth 
1 Revenues  -.13**   (.05) .04      (.08)  .07      (.12) 
2 Age    .00      (.26) .12      (.46)  .24      (.52) 
3 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelb     .62**  (1.16)   
4 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelc     -.42      (.49)   
5 Safety - Aspiration Levelb  -1.81*    (1.06)  
6 Safety - Aspiration Levelc  -2.80***(1.63)  
7 Reliability - Aspiration Levelb       3.39*   (1.75) 
8 Reliability - Aspiration Levelc      -3.18    (2.16) 
9 Efficiency – Aspiration levelb
(indicator variable) 
 1.93**  (.85)    -1.93    (1.12) 
10 Safety – Aspiration levelb
(indicator variable) 
-.72***(.19)       .08    (.45) 
11 Reliability – Aspiration levelb
(indicator variable) 
  .03     (.31) -1.20     (.81)  
12 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelb ×
Safety – Aspiration levelb 
-1.37***(.28)   
13 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelc ×
Safety – Aspiration levelb 
  .42***(.37)   
14 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelb ×
Reliability – Aspiration levelb 
   -.23     (1.13)   
15 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelc ×
Reliability – Aspiration levelb 
 -.26     (.37)   
16 Safety - Aspiration Levelb ×
Efficiency – Aspiration levelb 
  3.47**  (1.54)  
17 Safety - Aspiration Levelc ×
Efficiency – Aspiration levelb 
  -1.26     (1.19)  
18 Safety - Aspiration Levelb ×
Reliability – Aspiration levelb 
  -2.06     (1.32)  
19 Safety - Aspiration Levelc ×
Reliability – Aspiration levelb 
   3.41*   (1.99)  
20 Reliability - Aspiration Levelb ×
Efficiency – Aspiration levelb 
  -3.79** (1.80) 
21 Reliability - Aspiration Levelc ×
Efficiency – Aspiration levelb 
   -3.66*   (1.43) 
22 Reliability - Aspiration Levelb ×
Safety – Aspiration levelb 
      -.26     (.40) 
23 Reliability – Aspiration Levelc ×
Safety – Aspiration levelb 
     -.43    (1.57) 
24 Constant 2.22***(.83) -1.67     (1.91)  -1.09    (3.01) 
25 Year Dummies Yes   
26 Model Dummies Yes   
27 Obs. 245 241 250 
28 Adj. R-squared .464 .253 .229 
                             a Standard errors are in parentheses.  
                             b If less than zero. 
                             c If more than zero. 
                             *** p<0.01         ** p<0.05       * p<0.1
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Table 11 Summary of Attention Shifting Rules with the Alternative SA Measure 
 
Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3 Pair 4 Pair 5 Pair 6 
 
Dependent 
variable 
Efficiency 
growth 
Efficiency 
growth 
Safety 
growth 
Safety 
growth 
Reliability 
growth 
Reliability 
growth 
 
Second goal 
 
Safety Reliability Efficiency Reliability Efficiency Safety 
 
 
Attention 
shifting rule 
 
Modified 
sequential 
attention  
--- 
Modified 
sequential 
attention  
--- 
Modified 
sequential 
attention  
--- 
 
---  ---  ---  
Modified 
sequential 
attention  
--- ---  
Note: “---” means no significant interaction between goals; “P” means when the focus goal has positive 
attainment discrepancy; “N” means when the focal goal has negative attainment discrepancy. 
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Table 12 OLS Regressions with Other Control Variablesa 
 
Variable 
 
Model 1 
Efficiency  
Growth 
Model 2 
Safety 
Growth 
Model 3 
Reliability  
Growth 
1 Revenues    .00      (.03)  .01      (.03)    -.03      (.04) 
2 Age   -.03      (.12)    .30*    (.16)  .08      (.17) 
3 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelb -.29**  (.13) 
4 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelc -.74***(.10) 
5 Safety - Aspiration Levelb -.47***(.13) 
6 Safety - Aspiration Levelc -.42***(.10) 
7 Reliability - Aspiration Levelb -.62***(.10) 
8 Reliability - Aspiration Levelc -.61***(.08) 
9 Efficiency – Aspiration levelb
(indicator variable) .15     (.10) -.20*    (.11) 
10 Safety – Aspiration levelb
(indicator variable) -.18***(.07)  .15     (.10) 
11 Reliability – Aspiration levelb
(indicator variable)  .03      (.08) .07     (.09) 
12 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelb ×
Safety – Aspiration levelb -.44***(.14) 
13 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelc ×
Safety – Aspiration levelb .31***(.11) 
14 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelb ×
Reliability – Aspiration levelb .12     (.14) 
15 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelc ×
Reliability – Aspiration levelb -.07     (.13) 
16 Safety - Aspiration Levelb ×
Efficiency – Aspiration levelb .16      (.14) 
17 Safety - Aspiration Levelc ×
Efficiency – Aspiration levelb  .05      (.12) 
18 Safety - Aspiration Levelb ×
Reliability – Aspiration levelb -.11     (.13) 
19 Safety - Aspiration Levelc ×
Reliability – Aspiration levelb -.07     (.13) 
20 Reliability - Aspiration Levelb ×
Efficiency – Aspiration levelb -.16     (.10) 
21 Reliability - Aspiration Levelc ×
Efficiency – Aspiration levelb .16*    (.09) 
22 Reliability - Aspiration Levelb ×
Safety – Aspiration levelb .07     (.10) 
23 Reliability – Aspiration Levelc ×
Safety – Aspiration levelb    .01      (.09) 
24  Price   -.00      (.00)   -.00      (.00)     .00      (.00) 
25 Diversification    .50      (.40)   . 60      (.52)    -.51      (.54) 
26 Number of Product Line   -.02      (.02)   .03      (.02)     .01      (.02) 
27 Niche Count    .04*     (.02)   -.03      (.03) -.01      (.03) 
28 Nameplate Size    .10      (.08)   .02      (.10)     .01       (.11) 
29 MMC   -.01      (.21)     .16      (.24)    -.52**  (.25) 
30 ROA    .26      (.73)   1.25     (.96)    -.58      (1.00) 
31 Industry Size   -.00      (.00)     -.00*   (.00)  -.00**  (.00) 
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32 Constant -.84    (.89) -1.59*   (.87)  1.37*   (.82) 
33 Year Dummies Yes   
34 Model Dummies Yes   
35 Obs. 860 831 867 
36 Adj. R-squared .218 .241 .309 
                             a Standard errors are in parentheses.  
                             b If less than zero. 
                             c If more than zero. 
                             *** p<0.01         ** p<0.05       * p<0.1
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Table 13 Hierarchical Linear Regression of Growth of Goal Variablesa 
 
Variable 
 
Model 1 
Efficiency  
Growth 
Model 2 
Safety 
Growth 
Model 3 
Reliability  
Growth 
1 Revenues    .00      (.02)  .03      (.02)    -.01      (.03) 
2 Age   -.02      (.03)    .02      (.04)  .03      (.05) 
3 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelb -.06      (.09) 
4 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelc -.50***(.08) 
5 Safety - Aspiration Levelb -.39***(.11) 
6 Safety - Aspiration Levelc -.34***(.09) 
7 Reliability - Aspiration Levelb -.29***(.08) 
8 Reliability - Aspiration Levelc -.49***(.07) 
9 Efficiency – Aspiration levelb
(indicator variable) .07     (.08) -.29***(.10) 
10 Safety – Aspiration levelb
(indicator variable) -.15***(.05)  .14     (.09) 
11 Reliability – Aspiration levelb
(indicator variable)  .08      (.06) -.04     (.08) 
12 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelb ×
Safety – Aspiration levelb -.17*    (.10) 
13 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelc ×
Safety – Aspiration levelb .20**  (.10) 
14 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelb ×
Reliability – Aspiration levelb -.05     (.11) 
15 Efficiency - Aspiration Levelc ×
Reliability – Aspiration levelb -.05     (.10) 
16 Safety - Aspiration Levelb ×
Efficiency – Aspiration levelb .08      (.12) 
17 Safety - Aspiration Levelc ×
Efficiency – Aspiration levelb  .01      (.11) 
18 Safety - Aspiration Levelb ×
Reliability – Aspiration levelb -.09     (.11) 
19 Safety - Aspiration Levelc ×
Reliability – Aspiration levelb -.01     (.11) 
20 Reliability - Aspiration Levelb ×
Efficiency – Aspiration levelb -.14     (.09) 
21 Reliability - Aspiration Levelc ×
Efficiency – Aspiration levelb .20**  (.08) 
22 Reliability - Aspiration Levelb ×
Safety – Aspiration levelb -.04     (.09) 
23 Reliability – Aspiration Levelc ×
Safety – Aspiration levelb     .01      (.08) 
24  Price   -.00*** (.00)   -.00      (.00)     .00      (.00) 
25 Diversification    .14      (.26)   .22       (.36)     .05      (.43) 
26 Number of Product Line   -.01      (.01)   .01       (.01)     .01      (.02) 
27 Niche Count    .01      (.01)   -.02      (.02)   .03      (.02) 
28 Nameplate Size    -.01      (.04)   -.00      (.05)    -.06      (.07) 
29 MMC   -.02      (.12)    .16      (.16)     .17      (.19) 
30 ROA   1.02*    (.56)    .85      (.80)  -2.30**  (.90) 
31 Industry Size   -.00      (.00)   -.00***(.00)  -.00**   (.00) 
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32 Contstant -.84    (.89) -1.59*   (.87)  1.37*    (.82) 
33 Year Dummies Yes   
34 Obs. 860 831 867 
35 LR test (Prob>Chi2) 1.000 .43 .00*** 
                             a Standard errors are in parentheses.  
                             b If less than zero. 
                             c If more than zero. 
                             *** p<0.01         ** p<0.05       * p<0.1 
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Table 14 HLM Random-Effect Parameters and Variance Partition 
Variables 
Model 1 
Efficiency  
Growth 
Model 2 
Safety 
Growth 
Model 3 
Reliability  
Growth 
Random 
effects 
parameters 
 
Variance 
partition 
Random 
effects 
parameters 
 
Variance 
partition 
Random 
effects 
parameters 
 
Variance 
partition 
1 Company sd.(_cons)    .00   (.00) 0% .11   (.05) 3.2% .32   (.07) 21.9% 
2 Nameplate sd.(_cons)    .00   (.00) 0% .03   (.08) 0.3% .09   (.10)  1.2% 
3 Model sd.(_cons)    .00   (.00) 0% .00   (.00) 0% .07   (.10)  1.8% 
4 Sd.(Residual)    .47   (.02)  .60   (.02)  .67   (.02)  
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Table 15 Summary of Attention Shifting Rules for Subgroup Analyses 
  
Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3 Pair 4 Pair 5 Pair 6 
Dependent 
variable 
 Efficiency 
growth 
Efficiency 
growth 
Safety 
growth 
Safety 
growth 
Reliability 
growth 
Reliability 
growth 
 
Second goal 
 
 
Safety Reliability Efficiency Reliability Efficiency Safety 
 
 
Large units 
 
 
    P 
Modified 
sequential 
attention  
Activation  ---  ---  --- --- 
 
N ---  
Modified 
sequential 
attention  
---  --- --- Activation  
 
 
Small units 
 
 
P 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
N 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
 
Old units 
 
 
P 
Modified 
sequential 
attention  
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
Modified 
sequential 
attention  
Modified 
sequential 
attention  
 
N 
 
--- 
 
--- 
Modified 
sequential 
attention  
 
Activation  
 
Activation  
 
--- 
 
 
Young units 
 
 
P 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
N 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
 
Domestic 
units 
 
 
P 
Modified 
sequential 
attention  
Modified 
sequential 
attention 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
N 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Activation  
 
 
--- 
 
 
International 
 units 
 
 
P 
Modified 
sequential 
attention  
 
Activation  
 
--- 
 
Activation  
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
N 
 
Activation  
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Activation  
 
--- 
 
 
 
Aggregate 
group 
 
 
P 
 
Activation  
 
--- 
Modified 
sequential 
attention  
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
N 
Modified 
sequential 
attention  
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
Modified 
sequential 
attention 
 
--- 
Note: “---” means no significant interaction between goals; “P” means when the focus goal has positive 
attainment discrepancy; “N” means when the focal goal has negative attainment discrepancy. 
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Figure 1 Trend in Percent Deviations from Mean Levels of Fuel Economy, Safety, and 
Reliability 
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            Note: Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 500 reps 
Figure 2 Impulse-Responses for the PVAR Model 
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Figure 3 Frequency Distribution of Auto Model Fixed Effect Coefficients from Regressions 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: VAR with Panel Data 
A VAR is a multivariate simultaneous equation system, in which each variable under 
study is regressed on a finite number of lags of all variables jointly considered. The VAR 
approach is useful when the intention is to analyze a phenomenon without having any strong 
priors about competing explanations of it. The method focuses on deriving a good statistical 
representation of the interactions between variables, letting the data determine the model. In 
a simple bivariate system, a first-order vector autoregression model can be written as follows: 
yt = b10 –b12zt + γ11yt-1 + γ12 zt-1 +  εyt                           (6) 
zt = b20 –b21yt + γ21yt-1 + γ22 zt-1 +  εzt                           (7) 
The time path of {yt} is affected by current and past realizations of the {zt} sequence 
and the time path of the {zt} is affected by current and past realizations of the {yt} sequence. 
Both yt and zt are stationary. The errors {εyt} and {εzt} are uncorrelated white-nose 
disturbances with standard variances. The model presented by Equations (6) and (7) is called 
“structural” VAR since yt has a contemporaneous effect (–b21) on zt and zt has a 
contemporaneous effect (–b12) on yt. If b21 is not equal to zero, εyt has an indirect 
contemporaneous effect on zt, and if b12 is not equal to zero, εzt has an indirect 
contemporaneous effect on yt. In this case, these equations cannot be estimated directly due 
to the correlation of yt with εyt and of zt with εzt.  
Fortunately, Equations (6) and (7) can be rewritten in the compact form using matrix 
algebra: 
൤ 1 ܾଵଶܾଶଵ 1 ൨ ቂ
ݕ௧ݖ௧ቃ 	ൌ 		 ൤
ܾଵ଴
ܾଶ଴൨ ൅	ቂ
γଵଵ γଵଶγଶଵ γଶଶቃ	ቂ
ݕ௧ିଵݖ௧ିଵቃ ൅	ቂ
ε௬௧	ε௭௧	ቃ 
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or 
Bxt = Ʈ0 + Ʈ 1xt-1 + εt                                                            (8) 
where ܤ ൌ ൤ 1 ܾଵଶܾଶଵ 1 ൨, ݔ௧ ൌ ቂ
ݕ௧ݖ௧ቃ,Ʈ଴ ൌ ൤
ܾଵ଴
ܾଶ଴൨, Ʈଵ ൌ ቂ
γଵଵ γଵଶγଶଵ γଶଶቃ,	ε୲ ൌ ቂ
ε௬௧	ε௭௧	ቃ 
Premultiplication by B-1 allows us to obtain the VAR model in standard form: 
xt = A0 + A1xt-1 + et                                                              (9) 
where A0 = B-1Ʈ0, A1 = B-1Ʈ1, and et  = B-1εt. 
For notational purpose, we can define as ai0 as element i of the vector A0, aij as the 
element in row i and column j of the matrix A1, and eit as the element i of the vector et. Thus, 
we can rewrite Equation (9) in the equivalent form: 
yt = a10 + a11yt-1 + a12 zt-1 +  e1t                             (10) 
zt = a20 + a21yt-1 + a22 zt-1 +  e2t                             (11) 
In the standard form of the model, the errors et are composites of the white-noise 
processes εt and therefore have zero means, constant variances and are individually serially 
uncorrelated. However, the covariance of the e1t and e2t shocks is not in general equal to zero. 
The VAR model in standard form does not present the estimation problems of structural form. 
The OLS method gives unbiased estimates of the elements of the matrices A0 and A1, and of 
the variance-covariance matrix of the errors {et}. However, the estimation of the standard 
model yields fewer estimates than the number of parameters of the primitive model. For 
instance, estimating (10) and (11) yields six coefficient estimates (a10, a11, a12, a20, a21, and 
a22) and the calculated values of var(e1t), var(e2t), and cov(e1t,e2t). However, the primitive 
system (6) and (7) contains ten parameters: the two intercept coefficients b10 and b20, the four 
autoregressive coefficients γ11, γ12, γ21, and γ22, the two feedback coefficients b12 and b12, and 
the two standard deviations σy and σz. In all, the primitive system contains 10 parameters 
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whereas the VAR estimation yields only nine parameters. Therefore, to identify the system 
some restrictions on the parameters of the structural model are necessary (for example, one 
of the parameters might be imposed to be equal to zero) 19. 
A vector autoregression can be written as a vector moving average (VMA) 
presentation as follows: 
ݔ௧ ൌ μ ൅෌ ܣଵ௜ ݁௧ି௜ஶ௜ୀ଴                                         (12) 
where u is a function of the parameters of the model and A1i is the ith power of the matrix A1 
from equation (11). However, equation (12) expressing yt and zt in term of the {e1t } and {e2t } 
sequences is not very useful to study the effect of changes in, say, et on either {yt} or {zt} 
because the errors are correlated and therefore tend to move together. It is insightful to 
rewrite (12) in terms of {εyt} and {εzt } sequences. We can rewrite xt as: 
ݔ௧ ൌ μ ൅ ∑ ∅௜ߝ௧ି௜ஶ௜ୀ଴                                         (13) 
The coefficients of Øi are the impulse-response functions. The coefficients Øi can be 
used to generate the effects of εyt and εzt shocks on the entire paths of the {yt} and {zt} 
sequences. For example, the coefficient Ø12 (0) is the instantaneous impact of a one-unit 
change in εzt on yt. By the same token, the element Ø11 (1) and Ø12 (1) are the one-period 
response of unite changes in εyt-1 and εzt-1 on yt, respectively. To qualify the cumulative 
response of an element of yt to an unpredicted innovation in some component of εt, the 
components of εt must be orthogonal. If we assume that the Ω = E (εt εt’ ) is positive definite, 
then there exists a unique lower triangular matrix K with ones along the principal diagonal 
and a unique diagonal matrix D with positive entries along the principal diagonal, such that: 
ߗ ൌ ܭܦܭ′                                                   (14) 
                                                 
19More details refer to Enders’ (2010) book “Applied econometric time series”, Chapter 5. 
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Let 
߱௧ ൌ ܭିଵߝ௧                                                 (15) 
Then ܧሺ߱௧߱௧ᇱሻ ൌ ܭିଵߗ	ሺܭିଵሻ′ = D. Since εt = Kωt, the vector {xt} has a moving 
average representation in terms of {ωt} sequences: 
ݔ௧ ൌ μ ൅ ∑ ܭ∅௜߱௧ି௜ஶ௜ୀ଴                                  (16) 
For example in the two-variable case, we will have that 
డ௭೟
డఠ೤,೟షೞ ൌ ∅௦ܭ௬                                                (17) 
where Ky is the first column of the matrix K. The plot of (17) as a function of s > 0 is an 
orthogonalized impulse response function. 
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Appendix B: Fisher-Type Unit Root Test for Panel Data 
  Z_safety Z_reliability Z_efficiency 
  p-value p-value p-value 
Inverse chi-squared      P 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inverse normal      Z 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inverse logit transformations L* 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Modified inverse chi-squared 
transformation Pm 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       Ho: All panels contain unit roots; Ha: At least one panel is stationary. 
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Appendix C: Lag Length Specifications 
Lags AIC BIC 
1   4.32*   4.42* 
2 4.36 4.55 
3 4.38 4.65 
4 4.32 4.68 
5 4.42 4.85 
6 4.48 5.75 
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